

El Salvador and Colombia: Negotiation With Narco-terrorism Leads to Disaster

“El Salvador continues to serve as a laboratory for establishing the principle of limited sovereignty on a world scale,” wrote the Salvadoran Defense Ministry, in a 95-page book issued March 1, 1993, entitled *The Threat to Sovereignty and the Destruction of the State*. The book, a response to the United Nations Truth Commission report blaming the Salvadoran military for the vast majority of human rights abuses committed during a decade of communist insurgency and warfare, specifically accuses the United States and the United Nations Organization (U.N.) of collaborating with the Farabundo Martí Liberation Front (FMLN) guerrillas in a supranational experiment to destroy El Salvador’s Armed Forces, impose communist control, and set a precedent for establishing the concept of “limited sovereignty” worldwide.

“El Salvador is a kind of laboratory for the United Nations, a sort of experiment which, if it works, will begin to be applied to other countries in the world,” stated Carlos Guillermo Ramos, director of a study center at the Central American University in El Salvador, an FMLN braintrust. Ramos was addressing a November 1992 “International Seminar on Peace Negotiations” in Bogota, Colombia, sponsored by the Jesuits’ Center for Research and Popular Education (CINEP), at which he argued for stricter enforcement of international oversight of the Salvadoran “peace process.”

As *EIR* has charged for years, it is the active policy of the Anglo-American establishment and such instruments of its

power as the United Nations, to foment and bring to power communist narco-terrorist forces in Ibero-America in the hypocritical name of "democracy," as the most efficient means of eliminating those institutions and cultural traditions which have guided and protected national development in the region throughout its history. El Salvador was the laboratory experiment of the one-worldists in implementing precisely such a policy.

The purpose of this policy, the design behind the experiment, is *depopulation*. Admittedly, the genocidal implications of such a strategy may be hard to stomach. Indeed, there are those who have dismissed our evaluation as "exaggerated" or "extremist." And yet this policy was elaborated publicly by the U.S. State Department itself in early 1981, when Thomas Ferguson, head of the Latin America desk at the State Department's Office of Population Affairs, proclaimed that El Salvador was facing a "national security crisis"—because it had "too many goddamned people." (See Appendix A.)

Ferguson told *EIR* that a civil war in El Salvador would not by itself kill off enough people, but that dislocation, food shortages, disease, and a dearth of "fertile females" following prolonged warfare might do the trick. This line was echoed by William Paddock, an unofficial State Department adviser on population affairs who told a Georgetown University seminar on Feb. 26, 1981 that "continuous turmoil and civil strife . . . is the only solution to the overpopulation problem." At the time Ferguson and Paddock were speaking, some 10,000 Salvadorans had died in the war. Ten years later, an estimated 75,000 were dead.

El Salvador was indisputably a model for controlled genocide for over a decade. In 1988, the final phase was begun and the demilitarization project launched in earnest. So successful has it been that it is now also on the agenda for nations throughout Central America and the Andean region. However, let there be no mistake: This combined campaign of depopulation, demilitarization and limited sovereignty is global policy, and will be applied on a world scale if the one-worldists have their way.

Target the Military

Just as the Anglo-Americans' depopulation policy was unabashedly public more than a decade ago, so too has been their targetting of Ibero-America's armed forces. In 1988, James Chace, the director of Columbia University's Program on International Affairs and the Media, wrote a signal piece in the winter 1988/89 edition of *Foreign Affairs*, the quarterly magazine of the prestigious Anglo-American braintrust, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).

Chace wrote that the problem in El Salvador is now the military—not human rights abuses, but rather that the Armed Forces have served as “the closest thing to an effective national institution” in the country. Professionalizing the Armed Forces, Chace warned, would be a mistake, since this might create another version of Panama's Defense Forces. Rather, he said, “the best approach for the U.S. is to work for the demilitarization of El Salvador—and indeed all of Central America—which in this case means pressing for further negotiations between the rebel forces and the government.”

Former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Bernard Aronson put it most succinctly in a commentary published Oct. 12, 1990 in the *Washington Post*. Said Aronson, the U.S. has in the past “shrunk from cutting military aid in the middle of a war waged by a murderous and committed guerrilla army.” He promised never to make that “mistake” again, and insisted that El Salvador's military had to be drastically reduced as the basis for implementing “changes in the structure and size of the Armed Forces that would have gotten a Salvadoran leftist killed less than a decade ago.”

Today, it is a tragic fact that the U.N.-run “peace accord” in El Salvador is not only dismantling that nation's Armed Forces, but is delivering every aspect of national sovereignty over to “commissions” dominated either by representatives or supporters of the Farabundo Martí Liberation Front, the Marxist insurgency in the Americas most closely allied with the Castro dictatorship for the past 12 years.

This could not have come about without the help of the

U.S. government. As will become evident, the U.S. played a crucial role at every step of the way to force the Salvadoran government—through economic, political and military blackmail—to submit to the U.N.'s supranationally imposed "peace." One Colombian military officer just returned from a tour of duty in El Salvador with the United Nations "peace mission," summarized the situation in an interview with *EIR*: "The peace [which] the U.N. has imposed consists of the gradual delivery of power to the Marxists. The United States and the U.N. decided to give power to the FMLN."

A War-losing Strategy

Starting in 1987-1988, the unofficial line coming out of Washington, D.C. was that the war in El Salvador was "unwinnable," and that negotiations were the only solution. Sol Linowitz, founder and co-chairman of the Inter-American Dialogue, whose anti-military proposals dominated Bush administration foreign policy toward Ibero-America, and which today wields dominant influence inside the Clinton administration on Ibero-American affairs, wrote in that same winter 1988/89 issue of *Foreign Affairs* regarding Guatemala and El Salvador, that "neither country is likely to achieve peace through military victory." Instead, he argued, the U.S. "must begin to use its considerable leverage to actively promote negotiated settlements" and adopt a policy of "denial of economic and military assistance" toward achieving that end.

Thus, instead of enabling the Salvadoran government to wage effective warfare against the communist insurgency, the Anglo-American establishment signaled Moscow that a "common strategy" on shaping Central America's future could be negotiated with its guerrilla allies. In January 1989, just days after President George Bush assumed office, the FMLN released a new peace proposal as the basis for negotiations. It centered on the demand that military force be "restructured" to two-thirds its size. FMLN mouthpiece Guillermo Ungo told the *New York Times* of Feb. 26, 1989, that the FMLN proposal was an attempt "to corner and isolate the Army." The U.S.

State Department immediately issued a statement welcoming the peace initiative.

The State Department was quite familiar with the terrorists' proposal. FMLN commander and Communist Party chief Shafik Handal bragged that a copy of the guerrillas' proposal had been given to the State Department "some days" before it was released on Jan. 23, but "denied reports that the final proposal was tailored to meet the objections of State Department officials," the *Baltimore Sun* reported on Feb. 27, 1989.

The State Department was not the only U.S. institution consulted on terrorist strategy. The *Wall Street Journal* reported on Feb. 1, 1989 that the FMLN "peace" plan had circulated in advance on Capitol Hill. And the spring 1989 issue of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace's *Foreign Policy* magazine published a lengthy appeal for western aid, written by the FMLN commander whom western agencies identify as the guerrillas' top military strategist, Joaquín Villalobos.

The U.S. media went wild, hailing the FMLN proposal as an opening for peace. A *Washington Post* editorial Feb. 26, 1989 praised the fact that "the whole country has been drawn into a broad discussion of the FMLN's proposal." The responsibility of the Bush administration now, the *Post* cautioned, is to "make sure the Salvadoran Armed Forces know that the United States will not stand for any sabotage" of negotiations with the terrorists.

On June 1, 1989, following elections held under the strictest conditions of international oversight, Alfredo Cristiani took office in the name of the Arena party. Immediately, a wave of terrorist assassinations and assaults targeted a number of important figures around Cristiani believed to represent a faction unalterably opposed to appeasement of the FMLN guerrillas. They included secretary to the presidency José Antonio Rodríguez, who was murdered on June 9; Fire Department director Col. Roberto Armando Rivera, murdered on June 27; Supreme Court head Mauricio Gutiérrez Castro, wounded on July 3; and, most prominently, Edgar Chacón, head of El Salvador's Institute of International Relations, who was murdered on June 30. Chacón was an outspoken opponent

of international efforts to "domesticate" Ibero-America's militaries. In particular, Chacón targeted the Inter-American Dialogue, which is in the forefront of Anglo-American efforts to "take down" the continent's armed forces.

Said Chacón, in a Dec. 27, 1988 article, "The model of the Inter-American Dialogue can be summarized as the re-education of the Ibero-American militaries, to transform them into gendarmes of party rule. Their success or failure will depend on the annulment of national values which still exist in the Ibero-American countries, paving the way for internationalism."

Chacón also insisted that the assault on the militaries was part of a larger package to impose international usury on the demilitarized nations of the continent: "That is how Mexico and Brazil, with incredible natural and human resources with which to excel as true powers, have been reduced to the category of mortgaged nations, with more than \$100 billion in debt apiece."

Chacón's murder eliminated a crucial voice in the circles around President Cristiani which could have helped shape a war-winning strategy based on economic development.

Over the following months, there was a significant increase in both selective and indiscriminate terrorism, and an escalation in economic sabotage. In September 1990, Col. Mark Hamilton arrived in El Salvador to assume command of the U.S. Military Group in that group, and revealed to the press that U.S. Southern Command head Gen. George Joulwan "told me that my new mission was to get a negotiated settlement" with the FMLN. By May 1990, a combination of intensified FMLN terrorism and the Bush government's repeated use of the carrot-and-stick had "convinced" the government of El Salvador to turn to the negotiating table, and to the United Nations. Under the "good offices" of that institution, in July of 1990, the government and the FMLN signed an agreement on human rights providing for an unprecedented on-site U.N. verification mission to be set up in early 1991. With that "foot-in-the-door," negotiations on the "demilitarization" of El Salvador could begin.

This task was undertaken by Alvaro de Soto, personal

aide to then-U.N. Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuellar and brother of the notorious Project Democracy economist Hernando de Soto. According to the Jan. 24, 1991 *Los Angeles Times*, Alvaro de Soto declared that his goal in the upcoming peace talks was to achieve “progressive and complete demilitarization, the final objective being the abolition of the armies.” Despite the allegedly secret nature of the ongoing negotiations, press leaks revealed that De Soto had already proposed a plan to cut the Salvadoran Armed Forces from 60,000 troops to 15,000.

A U.N. Receivership

On April 26, 1991, the weak-kneed and coerced government of President Alfredo Cristiani signed an agreement with the FMLN which formally granted an active mediating role to the United Nations. A timetable for negotiating a ceasefire was set up, an agenda for “modifying” the functions of the Salvadoran judiciary and electoral system was defined, a “purge” commission to review the “status” of all officials of the Armed Forces was to be formed, and the government was forced to agree to the creation of a so-called “Truth Commission” under U.N. auspices, to investigate charges of alleged human rights violations during the decade-long war. Thus, all the elements of U.N. supranational control were already in place before the “peace accord” was even negotiated.

As part of the package, the Cristiani government and El Salvador’s National Assembly agreed to rewrite the nation’s constitution by including many of the reforms demanded by the FMLN toward restricting the military—even as the FMLN continued to wage war! Those reforms included abrogation of Article 30 of the Constitution, which mandates the use of the military to perform police duties during times of public disorder. Instead, a civilian national police force was to be created for handling the job of maintaining order *in the midst of all-out war!* Were the President to order the military to restore order under conditions of national emergency, the reforms specified that the National Assembly could override that order, by simple majority vote.

While the government thus began to "demilitarize," the FMLN was fine-tuning its own military strategy. Internal FMLN documents captured in April described the guerrilla negotiation tactics thusly: "We will use the struggle of the masses, *negotiations*, the attainment of agreements, and the elections as part of our *military strategic efforts*. Our military objective is to better use our forces and means in order to achieve the goals set. We may try to reach agreements on the Armed Forces issue at the negotiation table and, at the same time, establish the FMLN as a political and military force. *We will never accept our dissolution as a military or political force. We will take advantage of the dual power position in order to move to a phase of maximum deployment of political struggle, while maintaining and strengthening our military force.*" (Emphasis added.)

To be sure, elements within both the Salvadoran military and government put up a fight against the suicidal path the U.N. was demanding they take, but the U.S. used outright blackmail to force the FMLN-dictated reforms through. For example, when the negotiations stalled in early April, Gen. Colin Powell, head of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, flew into San Salvador on April 8 to meet with top military leaders. On April 12, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Bernard Aronson met with President Cristiani. Both delivered threats that U.S. military aid would be cut if the talks were allowed to fail. By the end of April, when Salvadoran legislators attempted to modify the so-called reforms, U.S. Ambassador William Walker personally called up members of the National Assembly to demand they reverse themselves. Under this kind of pressure, the reforms were eventually approved exactly as negotiated by the U.N.-FMLN team.

Alvaro de Soto had noted in a *Wall Street Journal* opinion piece of Jan. 11, 1991 that "a novelty of the Geneva agreement is . . . the specific provision for the [U.N.] secretary-general to rally international leaders who are in a position to assist in his efforts." That "assistance" also took the form of outright blackmail, and not just by the United States. According to Jesuit priest Rodolfo Cardenal, assistant dean to El Salvador's Central American University, a "group of friends" of the U.N.

was created in December 1991 at the behest of the United States to intensify the pressure on the Cristiani government. Father Cardenal was speaking in Colombia to an International Seminar on Peace Negotiations, held in late November 1992, when he revealed:

The United States suggested the formation of a group of "friends" of the U.N. secretary-general, made up of Colombia, Mexico, Spain, and Venezuela, to avoid resistance to the direct participation of the United States. I want to say, as I have said in all my presentations, that the pressure of the group of four friends has been fundamental in resolving the three crises that have emerged during the peace process. On these three occasions, the Salvadoran government had refused to comply with the agreements and the group of four friends economically blackmailed the Salvadoran government. Venezuela and Mexico threatened to suspend subsidized oil sales, Colombia and Spain threatened to begin a trade blockade, and the United States threatened to stop buying coffee from El Salvador. . . . On numerous occasions when the U.N. secretary-general could not resolve some problem, he called on the four friends. If the four friends could not resolve the matter, or it was considered more a matter for the United States, then the U.S. intervened.

An FMLN/U.N. Partnership

By the time of the official signing of the El Salvador peace accord in Mexico City on Jan. 16, 1992, it was clear that a deal had been struck between the U.N. and the FMLN. The establishment had largely achieved its objective. Former U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador Robert White put it succinctly when he wrote in a Jan. 16 commentary in the *Washington Post* that "power is to be shared with the United Nations." National sovereignty had been signed away, and more than a thousand U.N. and other foreign observers were descending on El Salvador to "monitor the peace process."

The FMLN, too, had achieved its objective, and was fulsome in its praise of the Bush administration for having made it all possible. "We wish to extend our hand to the government of the United States," said FMLN leader Shafik Handal, former secretary-general of the Salvadoran Communist Party. Salvadoran Liberation Theologian Father Cardenal later acknowledged during his November 1992 Bogota forum presentation, "The peace agreement in El Salvador would not have been possible without the backing of the United States." Speaking at that same forum, Jesús Antonio Bejarano, Colombian ambassador to El Salvador and a former government "peace" negotiator, said, "Coercion by the United States was key to the El Salvador peace process."

During the Mexico City signing ceremony, FMLN commander Handal had gloated that the main achievement of the peace accord was "the end of military hegemony over the civilian nation." What exactly did he mean by this?

The pact provided that, following enactment of a ceasefire, the entirety of El Salvador's political institutions would be completely overhauled and redefined in a new constitution, all overseen by the United Nations. New U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali called the accord a "revolution reached through negotiation," a phrase later echoed by several FMLN leaders.

At least six documents were signed in the course of the "peace" process, detailing the radical changes in El Salvador's government, economy, and military required under the supra-national accord, and a timetable by which they must be implemented. The scope of Salvadoran society to be revamped is astounding, extending far beyond any simple ceasefire and demobilization of guerrilla forces.

The documents specify reductions, purges, and a redefinition of the mission of the Armed Forces; mandate the creation of a new civilian police force, Public Security Academy, and civilian-run state intelligence agency, and detail how the leadership of each of these bodies is to be picked, the criteria under which they may operate, and the limits of their functions; set timetables for revamping the electoral system and judicial system, requiring for the latter a new training program and

appointing new members of the Supreme Court; outline criteria for a "National Reconstruction Program" and the creation of new institutions to oversee its implementation from land distribution, to foreign cooperation mechanisms, financial adjustment programs, a credit policy, technical assistance, privatizations, and so on.

All of these reforms are subject to verification by or the oversight of the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ) and/or the United Nations. COPAZ was created at the behest of the United Nations to serve as a dual power alongside the Cristiani government. It included two representatives of the government (one from the military), two FMLN representatives, and one from each of the country's political parties and/or coalitions—including FMLN front groups. The COPAZ thereby was rigged to favor the FMLN from the outset, assuring the FMLN an effective majority over the "national" body charged with resolving disputes that might arise over implementation of the accords. On top of that, the Catholic Church (dominated by pro-FMLN forces inside El Salvador) and the United Nations were then also given observer status on the Commission. Any disputes among COPAZ members are to be taken to the United Nations for resolution—thus granting ultimate decision-making power over national affairs to the U.N., officially empowered to override the sovereign government.

According to Philippe Texier, director of the Human Rights Division of the U.N. "observer team" in El Salvador (ONUSAL), COPAZ is "unprecedented," because it "considerably modifies the institutionality of the country: the Constitution, the judicial system, the electoral system, the creation of an army prosecutor's office, among other institutions."

At the heart of all planned reform, of course, lies the underlying premise that it is El Salvador's Armed Forces—not the guerrilla insurgency or any other factors—that is the root cause of the country's problems, and now must be dismantled. As agreed upon, the size of the Armed Forces is to be halved over a two-year period, down to less than 30,000 members.

But reducing the number of troops is to be only the begin-

ning. A Salvadoran member of the U.S. working team which had helped hammer out the U.N. accords under the direction of then-Assistant Secretary of State Bernard Aronson, Leonel Gómez, told the *Washington Post* of Jan. 10, 1992 that an important goal of the pact was to wipe out the Army's officer corps altogether. Gómez insisted, "As long as you don't touch the officer corps, there's really no reduction. The nucleus of the army is the officer corps; if you leave it intact, the army is like a balloon, you can fill it or deflate it but it's really the same army."

The U.N. accords require drastic changes in both the doctrine and mission of the Armed Forces. The United Nations has dictated that the mission of the Armed Forces is to be limited to guaranteeing territorial integrity in the face of a foreign military threat. Any role in determining national policies related to economic, political, and social matters—the very issues which define the parameters for real national security and development—is specifically forbidden to the military, as is participation in national intelligence functions, now to be handled by a new civilian agency.

Even a restructuring of the officer training program is spelled out in the U.N. accords. As the same Jan. 10, 1992 *Post* article cited above noted, "The military academy, considered the very soul of the army's officer corps, is to have its admissions policy, curriculum and faculty overseen by a national peace commission that includes two former guerrillas and just one member of the military."

A list proposing the purge of more than 100 officers was submitted by a U.N.-appointed commission of civilians charged with the task of "purifying" the Salvadoran military of officers *accused* of human rights abuses or deemed "incapable of living under democracy." Its deliberations were carried out in secrecy, no justifications were provided for its decisions, and no appeals were allowed. Despite a prolonged battle over the extent and manner of the purge between the government and military on the one hand, and the United Nations on the other, that fight appears to have been lost, when President Cristiani agreed to fire the last of his military officers, including his defense minister and top-level commanders.

What about the FMLN? It committed itself to completing a demobilization of its forces by Oct. 31, 1992 in return for which its members would be permitted either to enter the new civilian police force, or to return to the countryside to occupy land distributed through the FMLN along with government credit. Others of its members would set up an opposition political party.

The actual guerrilla strategy, however, was revealed in a Jan. 17, 1992 speech at Peru's San Marcos University given by Miguel Angel Amaya Cuadra, the FMLN's political-diplomatic representative for Ibero-America. He stated openly that "in the Salvadoran process, no surrender has been agreed on. We are negotiating as equals, as one power to another; the FMLN did not accept nor will it accept a demobilization, but rather a reconversion of its forces, where its combatants will belong to the new Civic National Police and will also join the productive sectors; and the FMLN will become a political party."

The peace accords not only granted the FMLN full status as a dual power in the country, but major economic concessions as well. Joaquín Villalobos, one of the FMLN's five senior commanders, declared, "What interests us now is economic power; we demand what we won."

Here too, the United Nations apparatus holds the reins. The agreement on socio-economic development specifies that the government must "grant legal and institutional facilities" for foreign economic aid to be channeled directly to "communities, social organizations, and non-governmental organizations" (NGOs). This requirement is designed to build up the FMLN structure, as has been noted openly by the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), a non-governmental organization of the United Nations and longstanding lobby for the FMLN in Washington and the U.S. Congress. As far back as 1990, WOLA was arguing in its newsletter *Enlace*, that all national reconstruction aid to El Salvador should be channeled through the NGO network, and not through any government representatives, specifically because funneling aid money through the government would only "reinforce government authority to the detriment of independent organizations which the government has identified as FMLN 'front groups.' "

As one U.N. military intelligence source just returned from El Salvador told *EIR* in December 1992: "Now the guerillas are going to have land, cooperatives, administration of credit, and they are going to obtain the votes they never had before." (See Appendix B.)

According to El Salvador's Father Rodolfo Cardenal, the peace accords include the distribution of some 180,000 hectares of land, "which is going to be viewed as the FMLN's most important social triumph, since that figure represents more lands than have been distributed under the agrarian reform in all of [El Salvador's] history." These lands have already been distributed under the command of the FMLN, and will be administered through cooperatives that will receive official government credit. "Of course, this in the future is going to mean votes, a lot of votes," said Cardenal.

Cardenal also noted that the FMLN was not likely to go for the 1994 presidency. "I have talked with them and the majority are in agreement. Many FMLN leaders think that it were better now to consolidate forces, in the towns, in the assembly, and to allow the right wing to take the presidency and discredit itself by trying to solve the economic crisis. I think the FMLN has learned the lesson of Nicaragua well."

Indeed, the "economic crisis" fits well into the calculations of the FMLN. The ongoing destruction of El Salvador's national institutions through supranational imposition of the peace accord fosters a dangerous instability, one which can only be aggravated by the fact that the country was devastated by a 12-year war of economic sabotage. There are estimates that as much as \$4 billion in damage was wreaked upon this tiny country, and yet, according to Mrs. Myriam Meléndez from the El Salvador office of national reconstruction, offers of reconstruction aid have barely reached \$250 million, of which \$120 million was given directly to former FMLN combatants. Under such conditions, no government will be able to rule for long.

The Lies of the 'Truth Commission'

The most devastating and perhaps the final blow to El Salvador's sovereignty came with the release of the U.N. Truth

Commission's report on March 15, 1993. By treating the FMLN as a legitimate belligerent force instead of as the narco-terrorist insurgency it is, the "Truth Commission" report redefined the war *begun by the FMLN* as "state-sponsored terrorism," and the casualties which occurred in that war as "human rights abuses." The commission report's fundamental conclusion is that the military of El Salvador is responsible for 85 percent of human rights violations committed during the war, that government-protected forces were responsible for another 10 percent, and the FMLN—its decade of warfare, assassinations, bombings, and destruction ignored—guilty of only 5 percent.

As if taken directly from the pages of George Orwell's *1984*, the U.N. "Truth Commission" arguments manage to redefine the concept of "enemy," transferring it from a Marxist guerrilla insurgency against a sovereign nation-state to the Armed Forces of that besieged nation. The report goes further, not only insisting on the immediate purge of the command structure of that Armed Forces, but also the immediate sacking of the entire Salvadoran Supreme Court. "The consequences of these findings could alter El Salvador's political landscape," the *Washington Post* intoned on March 16, 1993.

What is this U.N. Truth Commission which is being treated by media and governments alike as a de facto international court, and its report as a binding legal treatise? Far from being impartial truth-seekers, the "legal experts" who form the Commission have long been partisans of the very communist insurgents whom their report now absolves of major guilt!

Take the case of U.S. Commission member Thomas Buerghenthal. Before sitting in judgment upon El Salvador, Buerghenthal worked for the agencies which financed the narco-terrorist insurgencies in Central America in the first place. In 1986, Buerghenthal, then serving as human rights director at the Carter Center at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia, was named administrator of the newly formed Carter-Menil Human Rights Foundation. Former President Jimmy Carter provided the name for the foundation; Dominique de Menil, an heiress to the Swiss-based Schlumberger oil exploration company fortune, provided the largesse.

Each year since 1986, the Carter-Menil Human Rights Foundation has awarded a \$100,000 prize to one or two chosen "human rights" activists or institutions. In 1986, one of the two prizes went to the Group for Mutual Support (GAM), a well-known front group for the narco-terrorist Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), allies of the FMLN and, like the FMLN, also directed and supplied by Fidel Castro's regime. In 1990, another URNG-associated group in Guatemala, the Council of Ethnic Communities "Runujel Junam" (CERJ), received the award.

In 1991, the award was given to the Jesuit-run Central American University in San Salvador. Since 1979, that university has served as a hotbed of Liberation Theology organizing, and the braintrust for the FMLN. University officials may protest that this is not so; but as recently as November 1992, several top officials of the university were featured speakers at a forum in Bogota, Colombia dedicated to analyzing the successes of the FMLN in El Salvador as a potential model for how Colombia's narco-terrorist groups can reach the level of power now enjoyed by the FMLN. These university leaders, who included the above-cited Jesuit priest Rodolfo Cardenal and Carlos Guillermo Ramos, left no doubt on which side of the war they stood.

Nor were those the only times that the financier of the foundation administered by Buergenthal had supported the Central American insurgencies. According to *Town and Country* magazine of September 1991, Dominique de Menil doles out every other year a separate \$20,000 prize to radical activists. That prize, named the Oscar Romero Award after the pro-FMLN Bishop Oscar Romero who was murdered in 1980, has financed leaders of the Marxist Liberation Theology movement in Ibero-America, from "a Catholic activist in San Salvador" to Brazilian Cardinal Evaristo Arns, the "chaplain" of the Castro-spawned São Paulo Forum, of which the FMLN is a member.

Financing communists has been a longstanding tradition in Dominique de Menil's family. Her father, Conrad Schlumberger, was a financier of the French Communist Party; the first client of the oil company founded in 1929 by Dominique's father and uncle, was Lenin's Bolshevik government.

The other two Commission members are among the politicians in the region who have intervened to promote the narco-terrorist project through "democratic" means. The chairman of the "Truth Commission," former Colombian President Belisario Betancur, opened the first "peace negotiations" with Colombian narco-terrorists, specifically with the M-19, during his presidency (1982-1986). The M-19 sought to escalate those "negotiations" by taking over the Colombian Justice Palace in November 1985, murdering half the magistrates of the Supreme Court in cold blood, and setting fire to the nation's legal archives. Over 100 people died in that siege, which only ended with the Colombian Army's recapture of the Palace. It was later discovered that the M-19 had carried out their siege in the pay of the drug cartels, which wanted extradition dossiers on their members destroyed and pro-extradition Supreme Court magistrates "taken out."

Because Betancur's strategy of "negotiating the peace" (which he continued to champion even after the Justice Palace siege and still does to this day) was premised on making concessions of national interest to the narco-terrorists, continued years of such "peace dialogue" have not led to anything resembling peace in Colombia. What the process begun by Betancur did advance, however, was the M-19's "march through the institutions." In 1990, the M-19 was handed a cabinet post in the César Gaviria government, and from there orchestrated the rewriting of Colombia's national constitution along lines befitting its gnostic-Marxist political project.

The third commissioner, Venezuela's Reinaldo Figueredo Planchart, has served on various occasions in President Carlos Andrés Pérez's cabinet. Pérez was a President even more active on behalf of the narco-terrorists in Ibero-America than Betancur. For example, he hosted the Colombian guerrillas during negotiations with the Colombian government, provided them with passports, and so forth. He has long maintained excellent working relationships with the FMLN, the Sandinistas, and Fidel Castro.

His "human rights" credentials notwithstanding, Figueredo's laundry is far from clean. Even while sitting in judgment of El Salvador, Figueredo was charged by Venezuelan Prosecutor General Ramón Escovar Salom with aiding President

Pérez and former Interior Minister Alejandro Izaguirre in a scheme to embezzle \$17 million of government monies in February 1989. The Supreme Court has agreed to hear the case.

Arriving at the 'Truth'

How did the "Truth Commission" arrive at its calculation that 85 percent of human rights abuses were committed by the military—a supposed "fact" publicized around the world? Commission members and a staff of some 20 investigators and "human rights experts" reportedly interviewed nearly 2,000 Salvadorans and received information on more than 22,000 cases. Some 85 percent of those allegations were reportedly directed at the military.

Who were their sources? No one knows; all is "confidential." Even the March 16, 1993 *New York Times* acknowledged that "though the document has extensive footnotes and the weight of its proof is described, it does not include enough investigatory evidence to make possible an independent evaluation."

According to Defense Minister René Emilio Ponce, who rebutted the findings of the "Truth Commission" on national Salvadoran radio and television March 24, "The Armed Forces, as guarantor of the state's sovereignty, cannot accept the fact that its constitutional duty, which is defending the fatherland from any kind of aggression, was ignored in the report. . . . The Truth Commission report did not recognize the nature and origin of communist attacks in El Salvador. . . . In drafting its report, the Commission used biased criteria and sources to show—in its own way—preconceived facts and ideas. . . . At no time were the persons accused given the opportunity to reply to the accusations or defend themselves publicly of the charges made against them . . . thus showing contempt for the legal process that should exist in a state of law. . . ."

"The report did not mention the horrors and sufferings that the communists' so-called prolonged people's war caused in all social groups, particularly the poorest sectors, where the fury of the attacks were mostly felt. The report does not

remember the hundreds of children and young peasants mutilated by booby-traps, and those killed during attacks on public transportation buses, health centers, and government buildings. It does not recall the damage caused to isolated communities where bridges were destroyed, the damage suffered by merchants and workers as a result of so-called economic sabotage. It does not mention the hundreds of displaced people as a result of subversive attacks."

"To deal with such cases of violation in a partial way denotes a clear intention to destroy institutionality, social peace, and the Armed Forces. . . . Despite stating that its intention is to contribute to reconciliation, the fact remains that the report creates an atmosphere contrary to the spirit of harmony and reunification of the Salvadoran people. . . . Furthermore, the members of the Commission, in addition to being notoriously prejudicial, have not met any applicable judicial ethical criteria, are hiding unknown interests, and have jeopardized Salvadoran sovereignty."

The methodology used by the Truth Commission sets a number of dangerous precedents which narco-terrorist supporters in the human rights lobby have long attempted to establish. Chief among them is the declaration that the terrorists' above-ground logistical, political, and financial infrastructure—a fifth column without which the relatively small guerrilla forces could not sustain their military operations—should be treated as neutral or innocent, even in times of war.

While the Salvadoran Defense Ministry is emphatic that the Truth Commission recommendations put El Salvador's national sovereignty at risk, U.N. mediator Alvaro de Soto was equally emphatic on March 22 1993, when he insisted that those recommendations were "binding," and presumably enforceable. De Soto was thus setting the stage for a potential intervention into El Salvador, perhaps by the U.N.'s blue helmet troops, on the model of George Bush's "Just Cause" invasion of Panama.

On March 1, the Salvadoran Defense Ministry issued a 95-page book, *The Threat to Sovereignty and the Destruction of the State*, which attempts to set the record straight on the nature of the insurgency El Salvador has suffered for over a

decade. The book, which includes substantial selections from FMLN documents over the period of the 1980s ordering general insurrections, assassinations, and economic sabotage, raises the fundamental question of *cui bono*—that is, who benefits from the destruction of the Armed Forces? A summary of the ministry's arguments, taken from the booklet itself, is included in Appendix C.

Setting a U.N. Precedent

That El Salvador is but a laboratory for one-worldist experimentation was made clear by Angel Escudero Paz, a U.N. official representing that organization in Colombia. Escudero Paz spoke at the Nov. 25, 1992 panel on "The United Nations and Its Role in Non-International Armed Conflicts," of the International Seminar on Peace Negotiations held in Bogota, Colombia. Said Escudero, "The intervention of the Organization of the United Nations in El Salvador is highly novel and unprecedented. It is the first time that the U.N. has a mission in which it intervenes in an internal conflict."

The official said that although Article 2 of the U.N. founding Charter establishes that there should be no intervention in member nations without the approval of the nation subject to the intervention, and establishes unconditional respect for national sovereignty, "there is a new orientation in the United Nations that will lead to a change in its Charter next year, despite the fact that the Charter is not changeable every year."

"This new orientation has been expressed both by [former Secretary-General Javier] Pérez de Cuellar and by [Secretary General Boutros] Boutros-Ghali," who have defended the idea that "when there is systematic violation of human rights, national sovereignty cannot be used as a shield to prevent U.N. intervention." Thus, a change in the United Nations is expected this year "to address this new reality."

Specific details of the accord are also explicitly envisioned as a model for other countries. For example, the then-director of the Human Rights Division of the U.N. Mission in El Salvador, Philippe Texier, stressed in an interview published in the April 1992 edition of WOLA's *Enlace* magazine, that the

National Civilian Police being established in El Salvador under the U.N. accord—a civilian force operating under “new leadership, new training methods and a new doctrine,” which is being recruited from the ranks of the guerrilla forces as well as from the previous national police force (now disbanded) “under close international cooperation, supervision and U.N. coordination”—could be adapted for implementation in other Ibero-American countries in short order.

The ‘Salvadorization’ of Colombia

The one-worldists’ campaign to force a strategy of power-sharing with the enemy upon countries at war with narco-terrorism lies at the very center of the policy tug-of-war which has driven developments in the Andean nation of Colombia for nearly a decade—even before there was an “*El Salvador model*.” But with the United Nations’ imposition of an FMLN victory in El Salvador, the pressures to replicate that model in Colombia have begun to escalate dramatically.

Colombia has been a nation under siege virtually since the 1940s, when the Moscow-sponsored FARC guerrilla movement first began its war of subversion against that constitutional republic. By 1985, the FARC was joined by the Cuban-trained National Liberation Army (ELN), and other terrorist forces, such as the M-19 and People’s Liberation Army (EPL), in a single umbrella organization known as the Simón Bolívar Guerrilla Coordinator. But by then, the war against the Colombian state had expanded to two fronts, for the drug-trafficking cartels which had been quietly accumulating economic and political power for the previous decade, had now declared open war against the State.

At the same time, two opposing strategies of warfare were—and still are—battling for dominance within the government camp. The first, best represented by certain nationalist factions within the Colombian Armed Forces, seeks absolute military defeat of the enemy on the battlefield, to be followed by the offer of humanitarian terms of surrender. The actions of Gen. Jesús Armando Arias Cabrales, who commanded the military’s counteroffensive against the M-19-be-

sieged Justice Palace, in November of 1985, are a case in point. Although too late to save the lives of 12 Supreme Court magistrates who had been murdered in cold blood by the M-19, that military action put an end—at least temporarily—to the narco-terrorists' efforts to blackmail the then-Betancur government into negotiated power-sharing.

The military's well-targeted assault in December of 1990 on the FARC's central headquarters, the so-called "Casa Verde" in La Uribe, was another effort to redefine the terms of warfare. Casa Verde, which had served as the logistical and political command center for the FARC for years, had been untouchable for several long years of fruitless "peace negotiations." In early 1990, the M-19 narcoterrorists were amnestied, legalized as a political party, and granted both congressional seats and the promise of a cabinet post. The FARC/ELN guerrillas were confidently dictating their own series of demands to government negotiators, when the Casa Verde assault put the initiative, at least temporarily, back into the hands of the strategists who argue for defeating the enemy and *then* negotiating the terms of surrender.

Strategy of Appeasement

The opposing strategy, and the one which unhappily dominates government policy today, advocates combining limited military harassment operations with offers of negotiated power-sharing, the so-called *El Salvador model*. In Colombia, this approach can be philosophically traced to former President Alfonso López Michelsen who, as early as 1984, attempted to negotiate a political amnesty for the cocaine cartels in exchange for the "repatriation" of their ill-gotten billions of drug-dollars. López argued at the time that "positive law," that is, the separation of law from morality, had to be the guiding "rule of co-existence for citizens." López would later argue for giving the narco-terrorists "belligerent" status under the Geneva convention, to facilitate peace negotiations as "co-equals" with the Colombian government.

In 1990, López emerged as the head of a group of so-called "Notables" who initiated the negotiating process that led to

the infamous "plea-bargain surrenders" of the Medellín Cartel's Pablo Escobar and his lieutenants. Not only did the government give away its most powerful weapon against the cartels, the power to extradite, as an enticement to bring about Escobar's surrender, but it also gave what amounted to official sanction to the "surrendered" traffickers to continue their trafficking and assassination operations from their custom-made "prisons."

López's positivist philosophy similarly informed the negotiating strategy employed by Presidents Virgilio Barco and César Gaviria with the M-19 narco-terrorists and their communist and maoist counterparts. The process begun by Barco and concluded by Gaviria in 1990, of granting the M-19 a political amnesty and a significant quota of power, resulted in the thorough corruption of the Constituent Assembly and of the consequent National Constitution, drafted in 1991 under the combined auspices of the M-19, their cartel allies, and Freemasonry. Efforts by the FARC and ELN guerrillas to wrest still more extensive concessions from the government through a combination of terrorist blackmail and the negotiating process are currently stalled in the face of stiff military resistance.

And yet the pressure is already intensifying to force Colombia's government to throw open its doors to the very criminals who have ravaged the nation for decades. In just 1992-1993, two conferences have been held against the backdrop of an international media campaign defining Colombia's military as "human-rights violators," to demand a United Nations-mediated "El Salvador solution" for Colombia.

The first was the November 1992 CINEP seminar mentioned above, whose explicit purpose was to bring the El Salvador "experiment" onto Colombian soil. Although the Colombians who spoke at the seminar went out of their way to note "differences" between El Salvador and their own country, their appeals for supranational intervention and/or "mediation" only varied by degrees.

Of course, Colombia's own communists are demanding a U.N. "peace pact" just like the one their Salvadoran counterparts got. A Feb. 19-20, 1993 forum on Peace and Human Rights held in Bogota, Colombia and organized by the Colom-

bian Human Rights Commission, the Colombian Communist Party, and several of its political front groups, concluded with a formal request for the United Nations to facilitate a peace agreement between the Colombian government and the various Marxist guerrilla organizations that operate in the country.

In an interview with *EIR* at that forum, PCC Secretary General Manuel Cepeda insisted that such a U.N. intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign country would be viewed positively by the communists (See Appendix D.)

Cepeda's views were echoed at the forum by the Anglophile head of the Colombian Human Rights Commission, former Foreign Minister Alfredo Vásquez Carrizosa. The political chief and presidential candidate of the M-19, Antonio Navarro Wolf, has issued similar public appeals for U.N. involvement in Colombia, and has scheduled meetings with the U.N. secretary general to promote the plan. Navarro's presidential candidacy has been widely promoted by "human rights" lobbyists in Europe and in the United States, and will undoubtedly serve as a platform for demanding such supranational "mediation."

The Consequences

The murderous results of such alliances between the supranational NGOs and the narco-communists can be seen in the recent publication in Belgium of the book *State Terrorism in Colombia*. Issued under the auspices of some ten "human rights" NGOs—ranging from the World Council of Churches' Commission on International Affairs, to the World Organization against Torture—the publication contains over 350 profiles of Colombian military and police officials allegedly involved in human rights violations. According to military sources inside Colombia, many of the personal details used in the profiles were provided to the editors of the book by former Colombian Attorney General Alfonso Gómez Méndez and his wife, Patricia Lara.

Gómez Méndez, who served in the latter part of the Virgilio Barco administration (1986-1990), used his office as a

virtual branch of the human rights NGOs, conducting hundreds of "investigations" of the Armed Forces and National Police in the name of seeking out human rights abusers. During the most critical period of Colombia's anti-drug and anti-terrorism offensive, the Armed Forces were repeatedly hampered by Gómez Méndez's pro-terrorist maneuvers. It was his office which paved the way for imposing a civilian for the first time in the role of military prosecutor, and eventually at the head of the Defense Ministry as well, thereby eroding the unity and effectiveness of the country's defense forces.

It was also his office which gained international notoriety by conducting a witchhunt against Gen. Jesús Armando Arias Cabrales, the military hero who ended the bloody M-19 siege of the Colombian Justice Palace in November 1985. By assassinating half the Supreme Court magistrates, terrorizing the rest, and setting fire to the nation's legal archives, the mafia-financed siege succeeded in emasculating the Colombian judicial system and nearly won the surrender of the Betancur presidency. It was largely due to General Arias Cabrales's swift military operation that the M-19's terrorist blackmail efforts were defeated. And yet General Arias Cabrales was accused by the Attorney General's office of "abuse of authority" and "excess use of force" in ending the siege, and his dishonorable discharge from the military was demanded.

Lest one think that Gómez Méndez was a well-meaning, if misguided, prosecutor, consider his wife's pedigree. Journalist Patricia Lara is the author of an adulatory book about the M-19's "idealistic" leadership; she was detained by the U.S. Immigration Service in 1986 for suspected ties to terrorism, and was accused by the U.S. State Department at the time of suspected links to the Cuban secret police as well. She has also been accused by military sources inside Colombia of having been a former lover of M-19 founder Jaime Bateman and of being a Cuban spy.

The Case of Carmen del Chucurí

One of the most scandalous instances in which the "human rights mafia" reveals its true allegiances is the case of the tiny

village in Santander province known as Carmen del Chucurí. Around 1966, the National Liberation Army (ELN)—a combination of Castroite and Marxist Theology of Liberation fanatics—decided to establish its center of operations in Chucurí. Through unspeakable acts of brutality and terrorism, the unprotected inhabitants were forced to collaborate with the ELN. They attended obligatory indoctrination sessions, handed over cows, sheep, and portions of their crops, and provided the terrorists with information as well as their forcibly obtained votes for ELN candidates.

When Army Capt. Germán Pataquiva García was sent to Carmen del Chucurí in 1987, he quickly discovered that this so-called ELN bastion was a terrorized village. In an interview with *EIR*, Captain Pataquiva said, “We got the ELN out of Carmen del Chucurí without firing a shot.” He ordered his men to help the farmers sow their fields, build infrastructure, and make friends. “I told [the farmers]: I’m not asking you to collaborate with the Army. I only ask that you not collaborate with the ELN.”

Captain Pataquiva revealed that he was repeatedly saved from ELN ambushes through tips he received from the villagers. Fearful of losing its stronghold, the ELN retaliated by assassinating the town’s mayor, but the town fought back and elected the murdered mayor’s brother to replace him. The ELN dynamited bridges connecting the town to the outside world, and mined the fields with *quiebrapatas* (mines which caused maximum damage and left many farmers—including many children—maimed and mutilated).

Realizing that their intimidation tactics were not working, the ELN launched a legal offensive, inundating the courts with “witnesses” who claimed that Captain Pataquiva and others had created a “paramilitary” death squad that was committing human rights abuses against the population. The charges of the ELN’s “witnesses” received coverage by the human rights NGOs inside and outside the country, and, in 1992, a judge ordered a National Police raid to arrest the mayor and other town leaders for alleged participation in Captain Pataquiva’s “death squad.” Among the “witnesses” who targeted the mayor and the others was the town priest,

Bernardo Marín Gómez, a longstanding member of the ELN who was instrumental in running weapons to ELN commando units, and his assistant, Orlando Rueda Argüello.

The inhabitants of Carmen del Chucurí denounced this ELN operation, and their charges were published in several newspapers, which the courts—again under ELN instigation—attempted to silence with an injunction. One newspaper, *La Prensa*, editorialized its refusal to comply with the injunction, insisting that it could not “in all conscience” retract what it had published, since “we had gone to the area to gather testimony, defying the ELN’s reign of terror there.” In April 1993, the same judge who had ordered the injunction handed down a ten-day jail sentence for the director of *La Prensa*, Juan Carlos Pastrana. And yet, days later, the federal prosecutor’s office issued an arrest warrant for the priest of Carmen del Chucurí on charges of terrorism. His aide had already been captured by the Army, also on charges of terrorism and sedition.

Presenting Lies as Truth

Despite clear-cut evidence of the ELN’s legal maneuvers, such NGOs as Amnesty International and the various entities behind the book *State Terrorism in Colombia* have retailed the ELN’s lies as truth. Every military officer who had been involved in politically rescuing Carmen del Chucurí from its ELN captors ended up facing investigation and/or judicial proceedings for alleged human rights violations.

In February 1993, a delegation from the Committee of Guerrilla Victims (VIDA) traveled to Washington to present the Human Rights Commission of the Organization of American States (OAS) with a video revealing the other side of the story: the human rights violations, the terrorism, the mutilations and assassinations carried out by the ELN and its fellow narco-terrorists in the FARC. VIDA director Fernando Vargas charged that the Colombian judicial system was completely infiltrated by these terrorists and, as such, was actively responsible for sabotaging efforts to put an end to “guerrilla slavery.”

As of this writing, the OAS Human Rights Commission has issued no response to VIDA's documentation and the NGOs continue to present Captain Pataquiva and others like him as perpetrators of "state terrorism." Could it be that the OAS, the United Nations and other such supranational entities want to see a communist dictatorship ruling Colombia, now that communism has been defeated in eastern Europe?

Appendix A

'Too Goddamned Many People'

Thomas Ferguson, then head of the Latin America desk at the U.S. State Department's Office of Population Affairs, gave an interview to EIR magazine on Feb. 20, 1981. Excerpts from that interview follow.

Every hot spot in the Third World is in fact a result of failed population policy. . . . El Salvador is an example of where our failure to lower population through effective programs has created the basis for a national security crisis. The government of El Salvador failed to use our programs effectively to lower their population. Now they get a civil war because of it. Alone, that might not do anything to the population, but there will be dislocation, maybe even food shortages. They still have too many people there. . . .

There is a single theme behind all our work—we must reduce population levels. Either governments do it our way, through nice clean methods, or they will get the kind of mess that we have in El Salvador, or in Iran, or in Beirut. Population is a political problem. Once population is out of control, it requires authoritarian government, even fascism, to reduce it.

The professionals are not interested in lowering population for humanitarian reasons. That sounds nice. We look at resource and environmental constraints, we look at our strategic needs and we say that this country must lower its population or else we will have trouble. So steps are taken.

Our program in El Salvador didn't work. The infrastructure was not there to support it. There were just too goddamned many people. If you want to control a country politi-

cally, you have to keep the population down. Too many people will breed communism and social unrest. . . . In El Salvador, there is no place for those people, period. No place.

Look at Vietnam. We studied the thing. That area was also overpopulated and a problem. We thought that the war would lower rates and we were wrong. To really reduce population quickly, you have to pull all the males into the fighting and you have to kill significant numbers of fertile age females. You know, as long as you have a large number of fertile females, you will have a problem. One male can sire a number of females, especially in these countries, with weak family units.

In El Salvador you are killing a small number of males and not enough females to do the job on the population. If the war were to go on for 30 or 40 years, then you would really accomplish something. Unfortunately, we don't have too many instances like that to study. It would be different because it would be continuous political violence.

The quickest way to reduce population is through famine, like in Africa, or through disease, like the Black Death. What might happen in El Salvador is that the war might disrupt the distribution of food: The population could weaken itself, you could have disease and starvation, like what happened in Bangladesh or Biafra. Then you could create a tendency for population rates to decline rapidly. This could happen in El Salvador. When that starts happening, you have total political chaos for a while. So, you have to have a political program to deal with it. I can't really estimate how many might die this way indirectly, but it could be a great deal, depending on what happens. People breed like animals. . . .

For a long time, people here were very timid. They listened to arguments from Third World leaders that said the best contraceptive was economic development. So we pushed development aid. Look what we accomplished. We improved water and sewage systems, cut down disease, and helped create a population time bomb. We lowered death rates and did nothing about lowering birth rates. In most countries, this renders economic development impossible. Now we are reversing this policy. We are saying, with Global 2000 and in

real policy, that we must lower population rates. The idea is to get your population numbers under control as the primary issue—reduce population so that you can have development.

Most of the Reagan people, including Haig, share this view. They will go to a country and say, "Here is your development plan? Throw it out the window! Start by looking at the size of your population and figure out what must be done to reduce it. If you don't like that, if you don't want to do it through planning, then you'll have an El Salvador or an Iran or worse, a Cambodia." That's what we tell them.

Haig is an enlightened fellow on these matters. We have many supporters here in the State Department and in the rest of the administration. Cap Weinberger is a longstanding advocate of population doctrine.

Appendix B

FMLN Has No Backing

A military intelligence source from the United Nations Organization in El Salvador (ONUSAL) offered the following observations of the situation in El Salvador to EIR:

I have had the opportunity to talk with peasants, with the guerrillas, and with Salvadoran Army officers. The peasants did not support the FMLN. Rather, they feared the FMLN because if they didn't collaborate, they could be killed. The FMLN was never a large organization, nor did it have a chance of winning a military victory.

The FMLN's actions were only massive in 1989, when they announced their great offensive to take power. In fact, they always carried out very small attacks with mortars, which could be carried out with three people in a Renault-4 who later fled. These small attacks were magnified by the international press. Their actions were simply terrorist. A few people could plunge a city or a population into darkness, and these were the great attacks.

The FMLN's famous 1989 offensive, which was in fact the beginning of the peace accords imposed by the United States, was really no such thing. That offensive was carried out by men lent from Nicaragua. Nicaragua sent 7,000 men, and the

offensive was carried out with 12,000. The other 5,000 were squads of children under 15 years of age, headed by some "internationalists." These "internationalists" were Cubans, Colombians, and Peruvians who went to support the FMLN offensive. That is, they were from the FARC, ELN, Shining Path, the MRTA. . . . To give an example of how important the role of these "internationalists" is, the director of [the FMLN's] Radio Venceremos is a Colombian.

That offensive was a military failure, and afterwards it was very difficult for them to recoup. But at that moment, the idea of "the peace" and the idea that nobody could win was sold. . . . At the same time, the FMLN could only operate with international support. Apart from Nicaraguan backing, there were the refugee camps in Honduras administered by the International Red Cross. In those camps, the family members of the guerrillas received food, health care, and housing, while the other victims of the conflict who were not guerrillas remained without any kind of assistance.

But the guerrillas also went there to rest and recover from their wounds. When they were on Salvadoran territory and the Army chased them, the guerrillas would go to these sanctuaries [no-man's lands along the disputed border between El Salvador and Honduras] and there the Army was restricted. Honduras never dismantled the guerrilla camps for fear of international reaction. . . . In the Red Cross sanctuaries, there were also "Doctors without Borders," who cared for the health of the guerrillas and their families. All of them were Europeans, primarily French. There, recently graduated doctors did their rural internship.

On numerous occasions, the Red Cross intervened to assist the guerrillas logistically. Sometimes the guerrillas were besieged and the Red Cross would enter, allegedly to assist the wounded, but in reality it was to resupply them.

The most important military victories of the guerrillas were in the diplomatic negotiations and on the streets of U.S. cities, and not on the battlefield. The first thing they demanded was the dismantling of the rapid-deployment battalions. These were a few battalions with their own aerial capability which enabled them to immediately respond to any FMLN

action. This capability, for example, doesn't exist in Colombia, where soldiers have to be transported by land with the serious threat of being ambushed.

The guerrillas today are the ones who are judging the military, to determine who will be promoted and who will not. Three years ago one saw an army in combat. Today one sees a headless, demoralized army, which is going to be reduced by half and which in time will be completely infiltrated by subversion, because it is subversion which is determining the promotions.

Thus, one can summarize the peace the U.N. has imposed as consisting of the gradual delivery of power to the Marxists. The United States and the U.N. decided to give power to the FMLN.

Now the guerrillas are going to have land, cooperatives, administration of credit, and they are going to obtain the votes that they never had before. They are also going to have money from the state, while the only obligation of the guerrilla is to demobilize. They can say they are handing in all their weapons, they can present the same guerrillas over and over again and receive new identification to legalize themselves. Since there is no control, the guerrillas can receive two or three different identifications, and the FMLN can claim that it has already demobilized all its men. Within three years, the state is not going to have any defense, because that has already been destroyed by the peace agreements, and any little group can overthrow a decapitated, demoralized, and infiltrated army.

The guerrillas which before mortified the people by demanding their quotas of money, their collaboration, and who used serious threats to get it, will continue to threaten and demand; only now they will be wearing police uniforms, and now they will receive their quota not only from the citizens, but also from the state itself.

Appendix C

'Communism Is Not at the End of Its Road'

On March 1, 1993, the El Salvador Armed Forces issued a 95-page book, La amenaza a la soberanía y la destrucción del

estado (The Threat to Sovereignty and Destruction of the State), in response to the report by the U.N. Truth Commission. We include some excerpts here:

This document summarizes the following points:

That communism has not disappeared. Its immediate objective in El Salvador is the destruction of the Armed Forces toward consummating its assault on power. That during 1979 and 1980 the military was pressured to "get closer" to the leftist organizations, while on the other hand strong pressures were being exerted to purge from the Armed Forces those elements "allied to the rich class."

That El Salvador continues to serve as a laboratory for establishing the principle of limited sovereignty on a world scale.

That the surrender of Nicaragua to the Marxists in 1979 caused a proliferation of armed conflicts in the region. That the violence was directly fomented. It was not caused by economic reasons, but political reasons. That the armed conflict falls within the context of the East-West struggle.

That the subversive groups who imposed armed conflict in El Salvador are Marxist-Leninists. That the plans which they developed nationally and internationally were directed at seizing power to install a socialist government through use of revolutionary violence of the masses, terrorism, kidnapping, and sabotage; all within the process of the popular revolutionary war, the combative solidarity of the people, and proletarian internationalism.

That planned foreign aid was received opportunely and in sufficient quantities; that part of that aid continues to flow for carrying out the FMLN's political plans and to maintain a reserve of war materiel and other logistical means.

That political leadership has been challenged by both Salvadorans and foreigners, suggesting the interference of foreign governments and organizations in the internal affairs of the country. That the 1962 and 1983 Constitution clearly defines the mission of the Armed Forces.

That the Fatherland, our laws and the fundamental institutions of government as legitimate representatives of the people, are the only ones capable of judging the behavior of the Armed Forces.

. . . The guidelines imposed by the Communist International at the Conference of the Latin American Solidarity Organization coming out of the Tricontinental I [a meeting held in Havana, Cuba in 1966], contained implicit assignments for the destruction of Latin America's military institutions, the essential objective for seizing power of the subversive groups in these countries.

This destruction is to be carried out by different methods, whether peaceful or violent, by political or ideological infiltration of the institutions, undermining the discipline of personnel in order to cause divisions among the cadre, even to the point, where possible, of eliminating the top command by means of personal attacks or by political or conjunctural interventions.

This destruction of the Armed Forces is nothing more than an application of the aforementioned Marxist-Leninist guideline for seizing power. . . .

Developing sector governments and institutions are the object of interest of the economically powerful who politically intervene, occasionally for noble purposes but other times to rid themselves of those who hinder them or who are not docile to their interests. That is why it can be stated with reason that communism has neither crumbled nor sunk; it has not reached the end of its road, it has only changed its approach; it continues to pursue the same goal of eliminating any obstacles in its path.

Appendix D

U.N. Intervention Is Welcome in Colombia

The following interview with Colombian Communist Party Secretary-General Manuel Cepeda was conducted during the Seventh Forum on Peace and Human Rights, held in Bogota, Colombia on Feb. 19, 1993:

EIR: Do the Communists support Alfredo Vásquez Carrizosa's proposal to seek a U.N. intervention to facilitate peace negotiations?

Cepeda: We totally support Vásquez Carrizosa's proposal. We believe that if this alone is achieved as a result of this forum, we will have met our objective.

EIR: Why do you support U.N. intervention?

Cepeda: We think that a U.N. intervention could unblock the negotiations between the guerrillas and the Colombian government, because achieving peace in the country requires the entrance of a major authority. And the United Nations has that strong authority.

EIR: Aren't you afraid that the U.N. intervention would lend itself to a foreign intervention in the internal affairs of Colombia?

Cepeda: No, because the U.N. action to verify the agreements is a quiet intervention, it is almost a matter of a secret action.

EIR: But the U.N. massacred Iraq, invaded Somalia, granted the Serbs permission to carry out ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia, and is starving the Haitians to death. . . .

Cepeda: There are many different interests in the United Nations other than those of the United States. Note that the intervention of the United Nations in El Salvador and in Nicaragua was very positive. In El Salvador, with the peace process. In Nicaragua, the U.N. achieved the demobilization of the Contras.

EIR: But an intervention of the United Nations would lead to U.S. troops intervening in the country by putting on blue helmets. . . .

Cepeda: Military intervention in the country is already a fact. The DEA [U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration] is already here, there are innumerable U.S. military advisers, there are U.S. bases in San José del Guaviare, there are U.S. bases in Amazonas. We already have U.S. intervention here, there is already interventionism. On the other hand, an official U.N. intervention could be a positive intervention.

EIR: In El Salvador, an intervention of 10,000 people was required. How many U.N. agents will have to intervene in Colombia?

Cepeda: This remains to be resolved. Colombia is a very large, very complex country with a much more difficult guerrilla process. Here, the central issue is how many people will it take to verify compliance with the agreements between the government and the guerrillas.

EIR: So the U.N. intervention in Colombia will be more prolonged than in El Salvador?

Cepeda: Yes, in Colombia the process will be much more difficult, and much slower than in El Salvador. There, the guerrillas took ten years. Here, it has half a century.

EIR: Do you think the new Clinton government favors negotiations between the government and the guerrillas?

Cepeda: I'm not going to stick my neck out to defend Clinton.

EIR: But the Inter-American Dialogue organization, which is handling Clinton's foreign policy, proposes using the political weight of the United States to resolve conflicts in every country through negotiations.

Cepeda: Well, that position could be positive.