

It is in this context that Lippmann piles lie upon lie in his glosses on the Maximilian affair. Lippmann argues against Adams' opposition to the Canning proposal of a treaty, arguing that the Maximilian intervention was made possible because the U.S. had no operative treaty with the British along Monroe Doctrine lines. As we have noted, Adams was proven correct and Lippmann's argument indefensible by those Mexican developments. Lippmann quotes Adams' objections to the proposed Canning treaty: ". . . Britain and America . . . would not be bound by 'any permanent community of principle,' " (emphasis in source) because, Adams stipulated, the United States had recognized the independence of the newly formed Latin American republics, where Britain had so far refused to do so.

This Lippmann distortion of the circumstances and implications of the "Monroe Doctrine" is directly connected to the sweeping falsehood of his characterization of U.S. foreign policy during the 1823-1898 period.

His thesis is: ". . . for nearly fifty years the nation has not had a settled and generally accepted foreign policy." Although the statement was plausible to the credulous at the time it was written, it is in intent a fraud, but we shall return to that point subsequently. He argues that the U.S. "had a secure policy toward the great powers from the decade after the War of 1812 to the end of the war with Spain in 1898 . . . But . . . (since) the election of 1900 . . . it has (not) been possible for any President of the United States to rely upon the united support of the nation in the conduct of foreign affairs." We focus, as we noted, first on the fraudulent assertion that the United States had a secure policy toward the great powers during the 1823-1898 period.

The basis for the foreign policy of the American Revolution and the United States of the 1763-1828 period is amply documented in *The Political Economy of the American Revolution*, (2) as well as the circumstances of sharp shifts in both domestic and foreign policy during the period 1828-1863. It is therefore sufficient to summarize the most general points relevant to the case at hand. From 1763, and especially 1776 until 1828, the United States' foreign policy was overall predominantly a consistent Federalist policy, to whose essential features Jefferson in effect largely subscribed (at least for purposes of considering the 1763-1898 period in the broadest terms). The predominantly Federalist doctrine of the 1776-1828

period was continued as a partisan foreign policy of the Whigs and Republicans up through Lincoln's assassination, while the Baring-Rothschild-controlled national leadership of the Democratic Party from 1828 through 1865 — from Martin van Buren's loutish Andrew Jackson to August Belmont's 1864 presidential candidate McClellan — had a contrary (pro-London) *domestic and foreign* policy.

In effect, from 1776 through 1863, excepting the French affair, Great Britain was continuously the principal adversary of the most fundamental national interests and very existence of the United States. The expression of that fact as foreign policy under Federalist, Whig, and Republican leadership up to 1863 was the effort to avoid war with this powerful adversary, Great Britain, *by every acceptable political means*. Within the balance of means available, this foreign policy in detail meant unpleasant concessions to British demands and interests up to the point that forceful resistance was unavoidable.

**The 1815-1863 struggle of the United States against its principal adversary, Great Britain, centered around two points. The first, the most spectacular, was the British (Rothschild) forcing of a reactivation of black slave traffic into the United States, and British operations, conduited chiefly through New York City and New Orleans** (e.g., Belmont and Slidell) to build up the system of black plantation slavery. The second, underlined by the naked treason of Andrew Jackson's Presidency, was to destroy the technological progress of U.S. industry, to wreck the United States' national institutions of credit essential to the promotion of industrial progress, and to degrade the U.S. into conformity with the reactionary North American policy enunciated by the vile Adam Smith in his wretched *Wealth of Nations*. Through British control of the national Democratic Party — especially during the 1828-1864 period, not only were these wrecking and treason policies significantly effective on balance, but under puppet-Presidents of Rothschild Democratic Party kingmaker August Belmont, the U.S. government itself was the instrument, during the Buchanan administration, for the treasonous work of preparing the secession of the Rothschild-influenced Confederacy.

After 1863, the British government finally — eighty years after the Treaty of Paris — acknowledged in fact the sovereignty and integrity of the United States as a nation. In typically Rothschild fashion, the City of London financiers did not contribute pioneering venture capital to United States post-1866 development, but they did pour mass amounts of capital investment into *established industrial technologies*, especially those secured by the wealth and credit of the United States government.

2. Nancy B. Spannaus and Christopher White, eds., *The Political Economy of the American Revolution* (New York: Campaigner Publications, Inc., 1977), pp. 29-49, 235 ff.

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*by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.*