"HEAD SHRINKERS" VERSUS "HEAD FIXERS"

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Are psychoanalysts keeping their patients from the pills that will really cure mental illness? A full-page spread in the June 3 NY HERALD-TRIBUNE raises that question. HT's "science editor," Earl Ubell, writes: "At this moment, the practitioners of person-to-person treatment cannot point to a single strictly-controlled experiment — an objective evaluation — that proves psychological treatment changes psychological illness for the better." Ubell is accurately representing a view widespread even within the psychological professions: that psychoanalysis is not scientific because it is not statistical.

There is a common delusion that the only true sciences are the "physical sciences," and the only scientific method the mathematical method which has grown up in association with physics, chemistry and engineering practice. On the basis of this delusion a substantial number of academic and other authorities have demanded that the behavioral sciences — psychology, sociology, etc. — submit themselves to statistics. It is not hard to show that this is a delusion.
To begin, we shall cite from three important minds in the field of mathematics and physics.

First, from J. Clerk Maxwell, perhaps the father of modern physics: "Physical science is that department of knowledge which relates to the order of nature, or, in other words, to the regular succession of events.

"The name of physical science, however, is often applied in a more or less restricted manner to those branches of science in which the phenomena considered are of the simplest and most abstract kind, excluding the consideration of the more complex phenomena such as those observed in living beings." (Our emphasis)

Mathematical physicist Erwin Schrödinger looked into the problem of applying existing mathematical tools to living organisms and reported: "...it is in relation to the statistical point of view that the structure of the vital parts of living organisms differs so entirely from that of any piece of matter that we physicists have ever handled physically in our laboratories or mentally at our writing desks. It is well-nigh unthinkable that the laws and regularities thus discovered should happen to ap-
ply immediately to the behaviour of systems which do not exhibit the structure on which those laws and regularities are based."

The proposal to subject psychoanalysis to statistics is a product of empiricist philosophies at least closely related to what is called neo-positivism. When the positivist program for a general overhaul of science was introduced toward the end of the last century, mathematician Georg Cantor warned that under the terms of the neo-positivist program science "... degenerates into a decribing of nature, which must lack both the fresh breeze of free mathematical thought and the power of explanation and grounding of natural appearances."

The list and the quotations could continue into the night, but the point is already illustrated. First, there is nothing in statistical method as such which qualifies it to set standards of scientific method in the study of the behavior of living organisms. Secondly, there are definite indications that this same statistical method is incompetent as a basic methodological tool of the behavioral sciences.

The attempt to subject psychology to statistics is not new. Gestalt psychologist Wolfgang Köhler, commenting
on the past and recent attempts to establish statistical psychology, reported: "Today we can no longer doubt that thousands of quantitatively experiments were made almost in vain. No one knew what he was measuring. No one had studied the mental processes upon which the whole procedure was built ... In the meantime this lesson seems to have been forgotten." He continues: "One can hardly exaggerate the value of qualitative information as a necessary supplement to quantitative work. In the absence of such information, behavior psychology which easily become sterile as supposedly as it is exact... Quantitative research, I repeat, presupposes qualitative analysis in which fruitful problems are discovered."

What Köhler is warning us against is represented in the layman's experience by the batteries of various intelligence, personality and sundry aptitude tests which clutter up the personnel offices. The so-called intelligence test does not measure what the test's designers represented it as measuring, precisely because the designers began without the meagrest competent notion of what intelligence might be. So-called personality tests are a notorious and lucrative fraud created by the same psychological numbers racket.
What Is The Human Mind?

This attack on psychoanalysis has received significant support from within the medical profession. The physician who condemns psychoanalytic methods claims to have special competence on this subject on the grounds that psychiatry is properly a branch of medicine. While medicine has better claims to competence than statistics, the extreme medical attacks on lay analysis are just as incompetent as the statistician's.

While psychoanalysis emerged from medical practice in the person of Sigmund Freud, and while psychoanalysis continues to have important connections with medicine, it is not a branch of medicine, but of scientific sociology. It is on that part of the question that the Marxist, as an historical materialist — i.e. scientific sociologist — has greater authority than the representative of any other science. (Though we do not mean to say that all Marxists are automatically so qualified; the preemption is confined to those who have mastered Marxism as a science.)

It is easily understood that personality dysfunctions must tend to have organic consequences, and that the limitations and dysfunctions of the organism penetrate the psychological domain. Yet there is an interconnected body of evidence which con-
clusively demonstrates that the individual personality is not a product of the individual organism. The evidence of the true basis for the individual "mind" has been locked up for at least tens of thousands of years in religious belief; it is the analysis of religions, first by Feuerbach, then by Marx, by Durkheim, by Freud, etc., which has brought that fact into the domain of conscious, scientific comprehension. The individual personality, consciousness — like individual language — are from top to bottom and in every respect a social product. The old religions reflected that fact in the belief in the "Holy Spirit," the "Logos" — the "Word" of the Gospel of St. John, or, in more primitive societies, the "Mana" of the Melanesians, the "Nakana" of the Sioux, etc. In modern capitalist illusions, the fact that the human mind is a social product is reflected in the belief in "natural law," even in the faith in the jury system, etc.

Where the old religions believed that the mind was something immaterial, spiritual, like the "Holy Spirit," "soul" or "conscience", historical materialism discovered that this "soul" has a physical basis; not the individual organism, but all of the organisms — at once — comprising society as a whole.

That is not to imply that all minds are basically the same, etc. In a metaphorical sense, just as the individual cells or tissues of an organism are respectively individ-
ual and unique, so are the individuals in society. We say, therefore, that the individual personality is an individuation of both society as a whole and of the particular classes and other social institutions with which the individual is more directly associated.

Where the old religions and philosophies were compelled to divide the world into two parts -- the spiritual and the physical, the ideal and the material, the domain of the soul and mind and the domain of sense-perceptions and matter, etc. — historical materialism, scientific sociology and psychoanalysis have freed human knowledge of further need for the old religions and philosophies. Where the old religions reflected practical truths in the form of illusions, historical materialism has eliminated the need for such illusions, the need to divide the real world into two parts.

Just because of the old system of illusions the idea of the object had to be formerly conceived only as an abstraction, belonging to the ideal world of the mind, as a product of reflection. Marx, in his Theses on Feuerbach, gave the idea of the object in the human mind a material basis, showed it to be a reflection of material reality. That basis is human activity, specifically socialized activity. Once that concept is mastered
it follows that social relations — distinct from animal relations — are the unique, sufficient and necessary basis for the coming into being of human consciousness, the human mind, human personality.

It is that discovery of Marx! which shows to be silly the whole collection of "perceptualistic" theories upon which most of quantitative psychologies and sociologies are based. It is on this same basis that the claims of the physician are repudiated.

The origin of human consciousness is of this general, principled form. In elementary cooperation the individual depends even for his personal survival upon the activities of other human beings. In fact, the survival of the members of a society, the society as a whole, requires a certain general proportion, balance and order of activities within the society as a whole. Thus, the objects which must be acted upon in order to maintain human survival are for each individual known in terms of the activity of other members of the "tribe." In all primitive societies, this is demonstrated in a system of phenomena which readily admits of analysis: the totemic system. Here, man's knowledge of nature is of this metaphorical form: The objects of nature are known, metaphorically, in terms of the identity of the individuals socially responsible for controlling those objects, and the individuals are ident-
ified by the objects for which they have responsibility. (Even the feudal and pre-feudal systems of name-giving are clearly vestiges of the totemic system. When one is asked, even today, "What are you?" he replies with the name of his profession, job, trade, though the system under capitalist productive relations is by no means in simple correspondence with the totemic system.) A detailed study of this system was accomplished by the greatest sociologist, as such, Emile Durkheim. Because the individual's survival depends upon his comprehension of the activity of other individuals who are at the same time compelled to comprehend his activity, there emerges the idea of self. This idea of self is the central phenomenon of a whole array of concomitants, including the "subconscious," consciousness.

It is a dialectical irony that man can only begin to believe he is an individual at the point in history when man's ancestral prototype has ceased to be an individual. It is also true that the more intensely socialized human social relations become, the greater man's achievements in the form of individuality.

Just because societies are evolving organisms, it is necessary that each major alteration in the structure of social relations involves a corresponding major alteration in the content, character and form of human thought, of the individual personal-
ity. Also, within a society comprised of distinct "tissues," such as classes and special institutions, the individuals comprising the respective "tissues" have different modes of thought, different personalities than individuals representative of other "tissues." And, finally, it is within the extended differentiation of the component organisms of society that we have the *individuated* individual personality.

A shift of an individual from one institution or class to another entails certain basic modifications of his outlook on man and nature, of his personality as a whole. This is not just because different institutions are associated with different kinds of human activity and experience; personal experience is almost wholly secondary as such; the changes are effected by his social relations with other members of that institution. It is, metaphorically, as if liver tissue transplanted to bone were to become bone tissue, etc.

In these points we are able to trace from the most elementary conceptions of historical materialism the famous principle of *historic specificity*. We might proceed also to show how class politics and the Leninist principles of *democratic centralism* and *workers' democratic control* emerge from the same basis.
The Limitations of Psychoanalysis

The principle adopted by Freud as the kernel of his method, the so-called "reality principle," is in form a continuation of the principle of reality of ideas first reported by Hegel, except that Freud is a materialist where Hegel is an idealist. The materialist statement of the "reality principle" was first given by Karl Marx in his "Theses on Feuerbach" — in that "brilliant germ of the new world outlook." Yet, Freud's "reality principle" encompasses only one corner of the whole discovery effected by Marx in his "Theses." The most complete development of the Marxist "reality principle" is given not by Freud but by Émile Durkheim. Perhaps the best statement of that principle is Durkheim's:

"The most barbarous and the most fantastic rites and the strangest myths translate some human need, some aspect of life, either individual or social. The reasons with which the faithful justify them may be, and generally are, erroneous, but the true reasons do not cease to exist, and it is the duty of science to uncover them."

A less compact but identical conception is presented by Engels in a long passage on this subject, which he concludes: "...where on the surface accident holds sway, there actually it is always governed by inner, hidden laws and it is only a matter of discovering these laws."

This principle confronts scientific work
with two interrelated tasks. First, since every idea — even an illusion — or even a delusion — is related to, reflects some practical end, it is necessary to discover the true, practical basis of an idea, wholly apart from the wishful purpose which the believer may attribute to it. Secondly, we can not regard even the illusion, the wishful self-deceit, as merely capricious, but must also account for the practical reasons which cause illusions to occur in the particular form in which we confront them.

The second task is not as difficult in principle as it might seem to the naive, misinformed or prejudiced observer. Precisely because the entirety of human thought, personality, etc., is social in origin, a reflection of social relations, the form of human ideas reflects with varying degrees of apparent emphasis either the individual's dependence on society or society's demands of him. As we shall consider in a subsequent section of this treatment, the form of our relationship to society is structured in a particular way. That is, we do not just feel responsible to society as a whole, but our relationship with institutions is more directly associated with or symbolized by particular symbols and persons to which particular authority is attributed. To come to terms with those "authorities" — to propitiate them — is the general, most prevalent form of our essential social dependence. Most wishful thinking is readily reduced to a wish to
placate, propitiate, the angry authority which has withheld this or that desired benefit from us, or even to propitiate that authority by injuring it, etc. The ideas of possible magical powers over nature, the ideas of compelling a deity through prayer, sacrifices, the idea of capital punishment, etc., are all forms of magical beliefs, illusions, based on the "nature" of social relations and the structured symbolic forms in which that "nature" is expressed in individual consciousness. It is difficult to conceal the fact that in capitalist society in particular the authority-structure provided by the family is the training-ground in which the child is "brainwashed" to become a law-abiding wage-slave, etc., and that the prevailing authority-structure within the bourgeois family should be the focal point of the formation of illusory ideas, that family forms should become at least the metaphorical conception of adult experience with the social forms which family relations reflect. So, as we first asserted here, the task of identifying the causal basis for the particular form of mental illusions is hardly unfeasible.

The most common, most fundamental form of illusion is religious belief or patriotism, having much of the general form of mental disease. But neither are entirely illusions, just as the reality principle would warn us. Religious ideas have always contained more than a germ of realistic social practice, and the in-
tegrity of society, which is celebrated and reinforced in practice with the aid of the affective direction of "patriotism," is scarcely an extravagance in itself. It is always necessary to distinguish causally between the wishful, usually "propitiatory," illusion and the real objects of mental outlooks, beliefs, ideas. For just such reasons we can not merely affirm or deny that religion and patriotism are illusions, mental disorders, but we must say that they are at the same time both mental diseases and not mental diseases. For similar reasons, it is idiocy — or, worse, empiricism — to attribute any quality as such to any form of human behavior in itself. The psychologist who attempts to explain the state of the individual personality on the basis of reported phenomena themselves is a dangerous quack. The "Midtown" study, for example, has many of these objectionable features, of phenomenology, as we give it its scientific name.

Psychologists and sociologist of a liberal type frequently fall into the grave error of attributing mental and social disorders among individuals and groups to exceptional conditions, abuses and errors of society. In fact, not only is it evident that we can not correlate disorders of this kind with exceptionally oppressive conditions, but the real basis for mental and social disorders is the normal condition of bourgeois life, in particular. This, again, refers to the kind of error, phenomenological method, upon which
the idiocies of statistical psychology and sociology are predicated, the idiocies underlying the behavioristic outlook in general. In order to remove the basis for widespread mental and social disorders it would be necessary not merely to correct abuses — as the liberal conceives of abuses — but to change the entire structure of the existing, bourgeois, society, the form of the bourgeois family, etc.

While that implies a limitation for any forms of psychological therapy, it does not imply that individual psychology can not be effective, or, even, in many cases, indispensable. It is still possible to influence beneficially individual practice.

The dysfunctions of socialized practice tend to be of a self-aggravating form, and that is the basis for psychological dysfunctions of a persisting kind. Since the social product, the individual personality, is the socialization of the individual organism, this self-aggravating disorder may be without cure by the use of appropriate drugs which suppress the "positive feedback" characteristic of the way in which an afflicted individual "works himself into" a state of extreme dysfunction. But the cure requires a qualitative alteration of the
structure or the personality as a whole. That is to say, a patient can not go to a psychologist just to get his "tic" fixed; psychology is not a branch of medicine.

This reconstruction of the personality involves a qualitative change in some fundamental concepts; since in all cases ideas, concepts, in the mind correspond to socialized individual practice, therapeutic work has a necessary laboratory in consultation character, in which hypothesis is developed and tested in practice outside the "consulting room" to effect in this way the synthesis of new ideas, new outlooks. Such a process conforms to historical materialist knowledge of the manner in which ideas, concepts, are socially created within the individual.

In order to accomplish such a reconstruction of the individual's behavior as a whole, Freud and his early collaborators developed a method of inquiry involving essentially a qualitative investigation of the social history of the individual personality. The most important part of such an investigation consists in the exploration of the period of social history in which the personality is being formed by society, earliest childhood. Through that study it is feasible to reconstruct in a conscious way the authority-structure which society has imprinted, as it were, in the
individual mind. In the elements of this early formed structure we find the elements with which the elements of experience in succeeding life are more or less compelled to metaphorically identify themselves. Just as primitive society has its totemic system, so bourgeois society has its own specific totemic system, in which persons and objects stand in metaphorical identity. The idea of authority is a person, who may serve in one's "reflexes" as a totemic symbol of authority. That is to say, the investigation must explore and uncover the totemic system of the child's earliest experience, and uncover the interacting wish and practical ends with which the totemic system is associated, etc. (It is, for example, from the totemic system of capitalist social relations that the fetishism of commodities arises.)

However, the most important work is done in the first six months of childhood, a realm of experience which conscious recollection has not sufficed to plumb. Also, to account for the practical basis of personal recollections, it is necessary to go out from individual experience to explore society as a whole. These two problems confront individual psychology with limitations for analysis itself. And, since the ability to change individual socialized practice is limited by existing social relations, that imposes a second major limitation on both analysis and treatment.
Related limitations of psychoanalysis were reported by Carl G. Jung, who discusses for us the problems of what he terms the "impersonal subconscious." There is an area of the mind — a "dark" area — which can not be attributed to personalized experience by the psychologist's methods of depth analysis. This area Jung termed the "collective unconscious," recognizing that the individual personality was in that way a part of a "collective mind," a "Logos." He says of the individual side of it, the persona:

"But, as its name shows, it is only a mask for the collective psyche, a mask that feigns individuality, and tries to make others and oneself believe that one is an individual, whereas one is simply playing a part in which the collective psyche speaks.

"When we analyze the persona we strip off the mask, and discover what seemed to be individual is at bottom collective; in other words, that the persona was only a mask for the collective psyche. Fundamentally the persona is nothing real: it is a compromise between individual and society as to what a man should appear to be. He takes a name, earns a title, represents an office, he is this or that. In a certain sense all this is real, yet in relation to the essential individuality of the person concerned it is only a secondary reality, a product of compromise, in making which others often have a greater share than he."

Jung's great error was a metaphysical error, that is to say he attempted to reconcile his important discovery with the viewpoint, the philosophical outlook of empirical philosophy, and reconstructed a neo-Platonic mysticism, Platonic "realism" from these arguments.
It is when psychology confronts this area — this "dark" area — of psychoanalytic "indeterminacy" that it is compelled to seek in "breadth" what can no longer be explored in "depth." A movement in this direction was undertaken by Freud and Theodore Reik in their "sociological" works; that important tendency in "orthodox" Freudian psychoanalysis has been developed by the so-called "neo-Freudians," Sullivan, Horney and Fromm.

For analysis, this shift to "breadth" enables the psychologist to comprehend phenomena with a precision impossible by investigation in depth alone. However, the analysis in "breadth" is prevented from coming into corresponding practice precisely because what is implied is a fundamental change in social relations. That is to say, the socialist transformation of society. This transformation will not eliminate illusions, neurosis, etc., but will at least enormously increase the scope of feasible attainments of psychoanalytic therapy.

Our endorsement of "lay" analysis does not imply that medical training is not an advantage; for good reasons we would even insist upon an effective division of labor, collaboration between physicians and lay analysts. The social product, the human personality, is not something which merely cohabits the space of the individual organism, as if it were a soul, but is a transformation of the organic processes within the individual.
It is for that reason that psychological disorders must tend to have organic consequences and organic disorders psychological consequences. We have already indicated some of the indicated tasks for medicine in this domain. Nor would we exclude, but rather promote the work of the biologist in uncovering the organic apparatus most involved in the processes of thought. Just because of the replicative character of human thought and already attained evidence of a causal basis for its similarities in form to the replicative processes of, for example, cell reproduction, it is not difficult to envisage important consequences from such research, such as those obtained from improvements of reflexes, treatment of "senility," etc. We insist, however, that no pill will ever teach geometry.

A Mathematical Fraud

We can now, on that basis, return to deal more immediately with the proposal to mathematize psychology.

First, it is of some value to remind the reader of the kind of quackery which is unloosed when the empiricist outlook toward human behavior is left uncurbed. We might report, in that connection, that several researchers of most creditable academic standing are attempting to correlate admissions to mental institutions with magnetic disturbances! Or, a project, sponsored
by a well-known financial wizard, which proposed to attack the problem of discovering anti-gravity devices; this project's promoters listed as an important achievement to be gained, a reduction in lunacy as a result of the ability of anti-gravity devices to offset the effects of the moon's gravitation on the human brain.

It is the conceit of empiricist "philosophers of science" that "true" science represents some scarcely-attainable view of the universe as it would be seen by some super-being endowed with a more perfect perceptual apparatus than man's. This view was systematically demolished by Freud in The Future of an Illusion as "an empty abstraction without practical interest." Marx had long before already characterized such views, "a purely scholastic question." This conceit, this view, is based on a false and actually mystical conception by ever-many scientists of the nature of scientific knowledge in particular and the attainable objectivity of human knowledge in general. That is, the view embodied in this mystical conceit is aimed at attaining a body of knowledge independent of human opinion. The most completely deluded exponents of that conceit considers such super-knowledge to reside in abstract mathematics, mathematical logic. It is upon precisely that basis, that delusion, that it is widely considered self-evident that statistical "proof" equals objective knowledge.
If fact, formal or mathematical knowledge is confined to describing the systematic connections among established concepts according to the principle of "logical consequence." Abstract mathematics, the most concentrated form of formal methods of description, is predicated upon and historically limited to the kind of descriptions at least immanent in existing formal scientific practice. The idea of a system of relations among established concepts implies the existence (by "logical consequence") of a whole array of related ideas of systematic relations. The kinds of abstract systems which can exist in human formal knowledge are thus determined and limited by the specific kinds of systems formally known in terms of formal practice. It was on such grounds, in our quotations from Maxwell and Schrödinger, that we indicated the probable formal incompetence of mathematical methods based on so-called physical science for the comprehension of systems of human behavior.

However, human practice is not really individual practice, but is the expression of a whole social division of labor in society. Since our command, as man, of our universe is expressed, even when we act as individuals, uniquely through society, so the kinds of relations which man can know in his culture are social relations. That is to say, since man knows the universe only by means of socialized practice as a whole, the form of relations in which reality is reflected in the objects of human thought is the form of
social relations. For example, in primitive cultures (Durkheim) the system of classifications of natural objects is the totemic system of social relations. The Aristotelean classifications reflect the specific social (like "totemic") organization of a higher order of social relations. Etc., etc. The form of classification, the notions of causality, etc., arise not from individual direct experience with "nature" but from social relations, the socialized practice, division of labor, of society as a whole.

One might carelessly infer from this that human knowledge is therefore necessarily not objective. On the contrary, it is just because human knowledge comes into being in the form of social relations that it is objective; for the form of social relations, division of social labor, etc., is precisely determined by the real, effective relationship of society to the real universe of which it itself is a "constituent" part. Yet, at the same time, the form in which this objective reflection is comprehended is specific to a specific set of social relations, an existing society, and it remains "an empty abstraction without practical interest" to attempt to conjure up forms of comprehension independent of the forms immanent in existing or emergent socialized practice.

Formal knowledge is more or less compelled to confine its attention to definite ("discrete") concepts or distinct
"sense-impressions," more or less as if each idea of an object were permanent, self-evident. Yet, materialism has known since at least the time of Heracleitus and more recently through dialectical materialism and recent science that the universe is not composed of objects — "discrete" objects — as such, but of universal "energy," energy defined in the sense that Heracleitus conceived it, as universal "heat-motion." We live in a monistic, continuous material universe comprised of universal "energy." "Heat-motion" implying already the principle of constant change, it is from the action of this universal matter upon itself that that monistic universe acquires a definite structure, a structure which represents itself in human knowledge as "objects." These objects are not self-evident or "fundamental" but are conditional, temporary products of a universal dialectical process. That is to say, each object can be defined actually only in respect to the conditions of its coming-into-being and passing-away. It is because these objects are real and determined by the real structure of the universe that the interpretation of nature admits of the more or less distorted, never more than approximate correlations encountered in formal scientific knowledge.

The last and best effort to attain a formal kind insight into change was attempted by Immanuel Kant. Kant laid the ground for the rediscovery of the dialectic with his concept of development and his construction of the idea of synthetic judgment.
It must be recognized that it was the aim of Kant to establish a monistic conception of the universe, a theory of monistic development. However, his theory of synthetic judgment was the mechanistic method which implicitly attempted to reduce the universe to ultima ratios or things-in-themselves, and in this way Kant incurred again that bugbear of all formal philosophy and logic, the ontological paradox.

Hegel, in adopting Heracleitus' outlook (suppressing at the same time Heracleitus' materialism) was able to treat the Kantian problem of synthetic judgment effectively with the Hegelian dialectic, the conception of determinate being.

Now because the concepts of formal knowledge, formal mathematical science, are synthetic judgments, formal mathematical science is incapable by itself of providing a grounding for its own fundamental ideas. Of that formal method we must only recall the honest admission made by Kant: "... But by this procedure human reason precipitates itself into darkness and contradictions; and while it may indeed conjecture that these must be in some way due to concealed errors, it is in no position to detect them."

It is the distinctive feature of qualitative, as distinct from merely quantitative, research to attain the comprehension of real processes by synthesizing new concepts which are
coherent with the structure of the process as a whole. This synthesis — this invention — does not occur in that aspect of human mental behavior known in the terms and procedures of formal thinking; synthesis occurs in the domain of what is mis-named "intuitive" thought, or among psychoanalysts as "pre-conscious" thought. The dialectical method of analysis and synthesis is actually the extension of human conscious comprehension into the domain of the formerly "pre-conscious."

Statistics has proven itself a useful tool of "suspended judgment" in dealing with physical systems of the simplest quality, in which phenomena may be easily repeated, etc. However, in more complex physical systems, such as those of living organisms, human behavior, in which important phenomena may occur only once, etc., where metastability is the rule, where synthetic judgments cease to have historic importance once the correspondingly reality has been encountered, etc., statistics is inherently incompetent. As Trotkey wrote:

"As long as politics keeps flowing in one and the same forms: ..." truisms,"still more or less serves" its "task: not to interpret a political fact in all its concreteness, but to reduce it to a familiar social type, which is, of course, intrinsically of inestimable importance.

"But when a serious change occurs in the situation, all the more so a sharp turn, such general explanations reveal their complete inadequacy, and become wholly transformed into empty truisms. In such cases it is invariably
necessary to probe analytically much more deeply in order to determine the qualitative aspect, and if possible also to measure quantitatively the impulses of economics upon politics. These 'impulses' represent the dialectic form of the 'tasks' which originate in the dynamic foundation and are submitted for solution in the sphere of the superstructure."

As it is with politics, so with psychoanalysis, with any science. It is not hard to discern the implementation of the "reality principle" in Trotsky's analysis here. The method which he demands for the analysis of historic turns is remarkably (or, is it really so remarkable ?) parallel to the method and tasks of psychoanalysis.

Finally, we summarize our case on this point, that formal science, mathematical science, is required by its nature to limit its statements generally to the describing of formal relations among well-defined concepts, and is required in the course of such description to limit its statements generally to questions involving the affirmation, denial or "probable affirmation" of these concepts as such. Formal science does not actually "know," can not comprehend coming-into-being, and is therefore incapable of dealing with the fundamental problems of human behavior. On such grounds, we must regard the pretentions of statisticians in the domain of sociology and psychology to be pure fraud.
The Religious Side of Science

We have now to consider why official science should pre-occupy itself with this incompetent assault upon psychoanalysis. Does psychoanalysis in some way threaten the established institutions of formal science? We find that that is partly the case; psychoanalysis threatens to destroy science's opinion of itself.

Just because the existing array of known concepts and relations is socially determined, the philosophers of science err when they presume that objective science is something existing outside and above ordinary opinion. Durkheim has already made the issue clear:

"...it is not at all true that concepts, even when constructed according to the rules of science, get their authority uniquely from their objective value. It is not enough that they be true to be believed. If they are not in harmony with the mass of collective representations, they will be denied; minds will be closed to them; consequently it will be as though they did not exist. Today it is generally sufficient that they bear the stamp of science to receive a sort of privileged credit, because we have faith in science. But this faith does not differ essentially from religious faith. In the last resort, the value which we attribute to science depends upon the idea which we collectively form of its nature and role in life; that is as much as to say that it expresses a state of public opinion. In all social life, in fact, science rests on opinion. It is undoubtedly true that this opinion can be taken as the object of a study and a science made of it;
this is what sociology principally consists in.
But the science of opinion does not make opinion;
it can only observe them and make them more con-
scious of themselves. It is true that by this
means it can lead them to change, but science con-
tinues to be dependent upon opinion at the very
moment when it seems to be making its own laws;
for, as we have already shown, it is from opinion
itself that it holds the force necessary to act
upon opinion...

"... So opinion, primarily a social thing, is a
source of authority, and it might even be asked
whether all authority is not the daughter of opin-
ion. It may be objected that science is often
the antagonist of opinion, whose errors
it combats and rectifies. But it cannot succeed
in this task if it does not have sufficient auth-
ority, and it can obtain this authority only from
opinion itself. If a people did not have faith
in science, all the scientific demonstration in
the world would be without any influence whatso-
ever over their minds. Even today, if science
happened to resist a very strong current of opin-
ion, it would risk losing its credit there." (Our
emphasis)

Authority and opinion, including scient-
ific opinion, does not exist as some more or less amorphous general
body of opinion. We have already said that belief, knowledge, are
based on: social relations, and, more, that there can exist in be-
lief and knowledge only that which is already immanent or coming
into being in the existing or emergent social practice of society
as a whole. In sum, we have said, the set of social relations
embodying the whole social division of human activities is the
unique
sufficient cause for all of the beliefs, ideas, which come into
existence in the individual human mind. Now, we have also specifi-
ed that societies are not homogeneous, but organized into subordinate
"tissues," such as classes, special institutions. For related rea-
sons, the ideas within society are not all of the same color, but
there exist, in the first instance, sets of ideas more or less pecul-
lar to particular classes, institutions, and, in the second instance,
to individuals. The basis for abstract belief is discovered in the
actual, practical relations in the society, class, etc. Therefore,
from this basis opinion has in each case a particular structure which
can be understood and abstractly represented only by referring to the
structure of socialized practice within which it is localized.

In just that way the outlook of scientific
socialism, etc., differs from the prevailing empiricist outlook, the
latter common to the learned professions of our culture. Empiricist
outlooks regard society as the product of a political organization of
distinct individuals, each individual embodying inherent tendencies
reflected in the balance, the consensus, of general opinion. The
scientific outlook, on the contrary, has discovered that the individ-
ual and his opinion are an individualization of an organic social proc-
ess as a whole. It is implicit in this distinction that empiricist
method finds the problem of accounting for human opinion a source of
unrelieved mystery; that implication is confirmed in the despair and incompetence of prevailing "schools" of behavioral philosophy.

Opinion, we say, has a structure which reflects the structure of socialized practice on which opinion is predicated. Durkheim, we recall, stated: "The most barbarous and the most fantastic rites..." An apt illustration of the kind of problem and method of analysis is encountered when we treat as a problem the popular attitude toward the national flag, national anthem. To the naïve realist, reverence for the flag or anthem is a capricious feature of human behavior, an attitude, opinion without a real basis. Yet, it is easily recognized that the attitude toward such symbols reflects a ritual of submission to the authority of the society represented by the symbol, the society for which the flag, etc., is a metaphor. The history of religious beliefs affords an enormous quantity of material of kindred classes of belief. These beliefs as a whole contain substantial proportions of ritual and opinion which have no practical basis except to celebrate and reinforce the individuals' collective submission to society, their devotion above all else to the maintenance of the integrity of those social institutions with which the symbols, rituals and opinions are represented. The idea, for example, of the nobility of laying down one's life for one's flag.
Another important illustration of the nature of the structure of opinion is found in the various forms of dress and bodily mutilation. No society is without some form of dress and/or mutilation of the body. Some incompetent professors attempt, on occasion, to account for this in various wrong ways. One view suggests that dress arises from the need of the body for protection; it is true that the physical requirements of climate, etc., play an important part in determining the forms of dress, but they do not account for the phenomenon as a whole. Others attribute dress to human innate "decency." Bodily dress and mutilation are forms of ritual celebration and reenforcement of the individual's particular social identity. It is true that the idea of nakedness is associated with guilt -- this is not at all a sexual matter, as the asinine would imply -- because this nakedness implies a loss of social identity.

The question of dress and the bodily mutilation known as make-up among women of U.S. capitalist society, etc., is precisely of the indicated ritual form. To the man make-up may appear to enhance a woman's beauty; yet, it would make the same woman repulsive to a male not a member of the culture which places a premium on that particular form of female bodily mutilation. Just for example, as the standards of physical beauty vary from society to society. There is no such "animal" as intrinsic beauty; the idea
of beauty, like all other human ideas, is sufficiently social. The function of modes of dress and bodily mutilation in effecting an enhancement of "beauty" is a matter of social identity. Let it be clear that no man is attracted to a woman on the grounds of her individual attractions, as such, but on the basis of her social identity — even though that principle may be often expressed in a perverse way. Similarly, the woman's attitude toward the male.

Perhaps we are required to clarify one further point here. Much is made of the notion that the basis for the human personality is "sex." It is true that the phenomenon of sexuality is pervasive in the functioning of the human personality. Unfortunately, what sexuality is is not very clearly understood by laymen and even — from the evidence of literature — by many psychologists. Sexuality is not an epiphenomenon of the organic sexual apparatus; sexuality is the integument, the affective integument of social relations. It is perhaps the first affective outlook achieved by the infant, precisely because it reflects individual dependence upon society. Now, it happens that this affective "force" is expressed toward society in terms of an individual who stands, metaphorically, for society as a whole. It is sexuality which is the affective force of religious belief; it is this fundamental of all human needs, the need for evidence of social acceptance, to be loved, which
demands the most sensual expression, which it finds variously in the "sex act", in the fascist goon's beating of old men and women, in the wild orgies of sensuality of certain religious sects, and in the Roman Catholic mass. It is not hard to show how the demands of lovers and mates upon one another express their "unconscious" view of the "opposite" person, as the embodiments of society, in the way, direct and perverse, in which they demand of one another their needs from society as a whole, and punish one another, propitiate one another, as they would punish or propitiate society. The love act is an act of social atonement, whose importance is celebrated by the extremes of sensual "involvement" with which that act tends to be expressed.

It is in the proper comprehension of the business of sexuality that we can understand the rituals of dress and bodily mutilation, how bodily mutilation, a ritual celebration and re-enforcement of social identity, makes the subject of the ritual "sexually attractive."

Not only flags, make-up, etc., reflect the complex of ritual and opinion. Every moment of daily life, eating rituals, sleeping rituals, etc., is regulated by rituals and opinions. It is, of course, customary for people to rationalize these rituals and opinions in terms of "common sense," and sometimes,
though rarely, these explanations contain more than a germ of truth. For the greater part, we must look at this from the standpoint provided by Durkheim's statement of the "reality principle."

Finally, however, the authority of opinion is objectified in the persons to whom special authorities are attributed, to the speakers for opinion, such as priests, political officials, policemen, teachers, sundry "experts," etc. Whether the office is hereditary, appointive or elective, the people of an institution have only to install a person in an authoritative office and, be he a virtual cretin, they will attribute to him the miraculous authority of genius in matters relating to his office. Be he good priest or bad priest, he is still a priest and will be generally so regarded by the "laity," even by those who placed him in office!

We are not attempting merely to debunk authority — though that is itself a timely concern — we are only indicating that no institution, no human organization decides any case on its "objective merits," but in terms of its organization and in particular the persons to whom authority is attributed in that organization. This, we would be compelled to admit without shame, is even true within Marxist-Leninist parties! A Marxist Party does not decide questions on the basis of abstract merits — no human
institution does. The question is whether the organization reflects or objectively responds to the real process in respect to which it is deciding? That is, for example, the object of Lenin's inquiry in *What Is To Be Done?* How are the persons to whom authority is attributed selected? What is the composition of the organization, its division of labor, the rituals by which decisions are attained, etc?

Science as a whole is a special body of ritual and opinion with certain basic features of a religious sect. The scientific community has, like other institutions, its "flags," "national anthems," etc. This, the ritual side of scientific institutions, is most clearly reflected in the concept of objective proof. We see readily that the idea of a "law" in science is not an accidental carry-over from the idea of a "law" in other phases of social practice. The question of proof in science, as in all other institutions, is a moral question, a legal question. Each new opinion, to become accepted, must establish a legal basis in respect to the prevailing body of scientific opinion. We do not suggest that the products of this procedure are, on account of their mystical form, merely illusions or not objective. Just as religious beliefs and institutions have formerly contributed to effective social practice, so, science, displacing religious institutions from their former offices, proceed even by means of sometimes fantastic rituals to a socially effective end.
The statistical method which has lately emerged from the practice of so-called physical science typifies precisely such a ritual, set of opinion. This ritual, this illusion concealing some practical truth, rises above its effective practice to become a kind of article of religious faith — it becomes a part of the ideology of science, of the cult of scientism. To attack that tenet of scientism by argument or by example imply that another methodology is truer, more fundamental, is to evoke from the priesthood of scientism an automatic "closing of ranks" against the heretic, the alien intruder — just as if a visitor from Europe had burned the U.S. flag before an American Legion convention.

The philosophers of scientism, among whom the neo-positivists correspond to the "Jesuits," are inclined to engage in periodic crusades against any discipline which claims scientific authority on grounds other than those specified by the rituals of modern "Terministic" scientism. Psychoanalysis is regarded by these "Jesuits" as a particularly odious form of "protestantism." This hatred is not engendered merely in the interests of some abstract cause; it has a basis in the established bourgeois legal structures of the scientific community, a legal structure exemplified in the processes of bourgeois education.
A Scandal in Higher Education

Any former student who has been sensitive to his experience in the processes of higher education can report the enormous proportion of effort and time devoted to stultification in the name of education. This stultification—attacked to some extent recurrently by "progressive education"—is a reflection of the religious character of organized intellectual life in general and science in particular. The key to comprehending higher education is to see the effort expended in drilling the student in terms of the rituals of "proof" and accredited argumentation.

To those who accept the prevailing illusions this drill might seem commendable practice. Many fools actually believe and assert that drill is the road to creative work. In fact, the opposite is true. In the rearing of children, excessive authority, discipline impairs the capacity of the child to generalize from his experience. This is because excessive authority and discipline tend to compel the child to solve problems almost exclusively by means of propitiating authority, by legalistic rituals, rather than relying more on his own problem-solving capacities. Creative work consists precisely in the development of the independent problem-solving capacities of the child, which are only developed to the de-
gree that they are exhcrizc; it is of obvious importance that this
habit of creative exercise ought to be developed as early in individ-
ual life as possible — such as during the first six months of life,
which parental feeding and general infant-handling attitudes tend
to lay the basis for the individual personality. Or, creative hab-
its of thinking may be developed by the child's effective self-assert-
on of areas of independence from adults. (Of course, if rebellion
does not lead to the exercise of the creative "faculties" we have to
rather than a "genius" only a disturbed individual) Creative work
is cultured only by the exercise of the creative "faculties," and is
inhibited by stultifying, authority-centered drill.

Even the solution of a mathematical prob-
lem might amply illustrate the process under consideration. There
is the case, first, of the "false" problem. In the case of the "false"
problem the student is given the task of solving a statement, in which
the problem-statement is only a restatement of the preceding drill.
The student has only to recognize the terms provided in the drill to
calculate the required "correct answer" by means of prescribed proced-
ures. There is, secondly, the problem — a "true" problem — in
which there is supplied no "programmed learning" cues; in this case
the student has to synthesize an original (at least to him) concept
of the structure of the problem; the solution is then deduced from
the conception the student has invented.
A good mathematics instructor, with a class of bright students, will make every effort to avoid giving "programmed learning" forms of ritual drill instruction. Instead, he will constantly confront the class with new kinds of problems of the most elementary form, that is to say stripped of as much mere detail as possible. The poor instructor — especially the instructor who has no real mastery of his subject — will rely entirely on methods of "programmed learning." His problems and questions will be of the form of trick "legal" questions, which determine whether the student has obediently drilled himself in all corners and crannies of his text-book and class ritual instruction. Since higher education uses methods of successive approximation generally, the student who is subjected to poor instructional methods is compelled to accept on faith in one course conceptions which he has to unlearn in a succeeding course. This method of instruction has ironic similarities to the methods of "obedience training" used for dogs, trained seals.

The synthesis of new conceptions is not usually seen in the worked-out solutions; we see only the worked-out solution, which is to say the "legalized" expression of the creative end-product. We see the solution only in its language-form, the form of its legalized social currency. Formalists protest that
this social form, the statement of proof, is the basis for scientific work, suppressing the facts relating to the means by which the actual discovery was made.

Now, it was the genius of Hegel to present — albeit in a monstrous form of circumlocution and philosophical obfuscation — the underlying "laws" of human thought. The most immediate proof of this is obtained through an analysis of the history of synthetic judgments. Even Kant and, more emphatically the neo-Kantians who could not pretend to be entirely ignorant of Hegel, recognized the limitations of formal logic, that the comprehension of the synthetic judgment could not ignore the "theory of knowledge" generally, or psychology in particular. Hegel, in solving the problem of the synthetic judgment by means of the dialectic, laid bare the form of the human thought-process, at least its elementary features.

It is characteristic of conscious thought that it represents generally only those conceptions for which there exists a corresponding form of established communication in social currency, or at least emergent forms arising from the domain of socially current forms. Thus, that which is suppressed, denied social currency, is compelled to exist in the human mind outside the realm of consciousness, as if it were illegal. (Of course, we also know that only similar grounds forms susceptible of communication are also
It is those laws of thought, the dialectical process of synthesis of fresh concepts, now "synthetic judgments," which are concealed by the practice of presenting a new idea only in its legalistic, empirical form. It is not only a suppression of the "evil" dialectic, but even a less subtle kind of dishonesty, self-deception, through which the inventor shows himself to be at great pains to conceal the means, the true source of his invention. He introduces it to public scrutiny not as he found it, but as he patched it up, deformed it, concealed the nakedness of its birth. The history of important ideas as they are presented for public view, and the history of ideas as they are created, are two distinct histories with a meagre likeness between the two.
driven from the domain of consciousness.) For this reason, because the actual processes of creative thought are denied recognition in social currency, they are regarded as impalpable and termed generally "intuitive." Now it is also true that lumped into the class of intuitions so-called are all the dark wishes and suppressed motivations which society or the individual regards as "illegal." This cohabitation of creative thought processes with "criminal" tendencies only suggests, and legitimately so, that creative thought processes are regarded by society in some way as "criminal" tendencies.

This might seem to confirm a belief that the individual personality is comprised of one part that is social, on the surface, and an asocial, individual part beneath. On the contrary, the suppressed part is as social — as Jung discovered — as the surface. Contradiction does not properly imply that the affirmation of one side of a contradiction is the denial of the other — we have, in this feature of the personality, an exemplary illustration of the interpenetration of opposites. Both are socially determined, thesis and antithesis, in respect to which the synthesis of new conscious forms represents synthetic judgment. Again, this does not imply that ideas reflect anything but reality, but only that ideas are not a product of simple, mechanically-conceived process of perception-by-themselves, that thoughts are not merely
sense-impressions. In exploring the contradictory aspects of the human personality, we are only discovering an important aspect of the process by which objective knowledge is to be attained.

A most important discussion of one side of this problem is found in the Spring, 1962, issue of Daedalus, in Lawrence Kubie's article, "The Fostering of Creative Scientific Productivity." He states the problem:

"No one knows as yet how widely and evenly distributed latent creative potential is in the population as a whole. We know only that, given a certain opportunity and a certain permutation concatenation of internal and external forces, a certain number of students 'survive' the rigors of our techniques of selection and education. Unhappily, we also know that the ability to 'survive' does not correlate closely with the ability to produce creatively later. We know rather that the creative capacity of many is destroyed, only a few survivors retaining their creative zest and skill...."

Kubie reports his conferences with "departmental and administrative heads in various institutions for research and training in different fields of science:"

"They describe students who have a high absorptive capacity and who are always able to reproduce learned material with facility and fidelity, but who never become creative...etc., etc."

What is it that seems to be destroyed? What is this creative ability, this creative activity which seems often antithetical to successful scholastic performance?
"As stated elsewhere, the uncovering of new data and of new relationships among both new and old data is not the whole of creativity, but it is that addition to the mastery of established data which characterizes creativity. Thus creativity implies invention: to wit, 'the making of new machines or processes by the application of new or old principles, or by a combination of them in order to uncover still newer facts and newer combinations, thus to synthesize new patterns out of data whose interdependence had hitherto gone unnoted and unused.' Or again, 'Cogitation and intelligence:' that is, 'Cogito -- shaking things up, to roll the bones of one's ideas, memories and feelings, to make a great melting-pot of experience: plus the superimposed process of intelligence, i.e., consciously, self-critically but retrospectively to go through an after-the-act process of choosing from among unanticipated combinations those patterns which have new significance.' That is what constitutes creative activity.

"Here the critical psychological fact is that the recognition of new data and new relationships and the assembling of new combinations are predominantly a preconscious process, not the outcome of either unconscious processes (as is mistakenly claimed) or of conscious rumination. The former confines and restricts the play of preconscious processing. The latter samples it in a pedestrian fashion, checks it and tests it, and anchors it to reality. Therefore, the impact of these two concurrent processes on the free play of preconscious processing should be the focus of every inquiry into the influence of any educational program on the creative potential of human beings. This is where we would find the interplay between psychosocial processes and the ubiquitous masked neurotic processes of the so-called 'normal!'

Then, in his summary, Kubie presents an argument paralleling that we have already submitted. A comparison of our view and his, respecting the different basis from which they have respectively proceeded, may be of substantial value to the reader in his attainment of his own conclusions and comprehension of the subject before us here:
"In the higher education of scientists, we seem to be duplicating a mistake to which we have all become accustomed in the earlier phases of child development. It is well known that the small child has an extraordinarily free and creative imagination, which he manifest in his use of words, images, color, design and tones, and his general attitude to the world about him. Under the impact of many forces which operate in early life, this freely creative imagination usually disappears or at least goes underground. We know the nature of some of the destructive forces, but not all. We can recognize that some arise as a distortion of the child's own development. We know also that his spontaneous inhibitory processes are re-enforced by many cultural attitudes, by the 'conspiracy of silence' that surrounds the problems which are most important to the child, his struggles over his lustful and destructive impulses and over his curiosity about the human body and its apertures, products, functions, feelings, and sensations. Later the inhibitory processes are further re-enforced by certain ingredients in our educational system, specifically by a fetishistic emphasis on drill and drill. In the educational processes of advanced scientific training, the destructive ingredients seem even more strongly entrenched. This would appear to be why so many gifted young students of science who have been carefully screened and selected undergo a profound attrition of their creative potentials...

"Not many of even the gifted and potentially creative students survive the impact of drill and grill. We do not know how many survive and how many fail. We know only that a heavy toll is paid. Those who are destroyed constitute a wastage of creative manpower, caused by a method education which destroys creativity and the freedom of our preconscious functions. Yet this destruction is certainly not due to educational processes alone. There is an earlier process of destruction that arises out of those deep veils of unrecognized guilt and fear which hamper the free play of human imagination. These neurotogenic forces are universal but variable. They are intensified but not created by the impact of a wrong oriented educational process."
Since human mental life is metaphorical in the way in which it identifies those objects which are the subject of activity with persons, and since it would be a violation of the fundamental principle of true science, the "reality principle" of Hegel, Marx, Durkheim and Freud, to regard the errors of higher education simply as errors, we are led to account in a more fundamental way than Kubie undertakes for the "neurotogenic processes" of higher education. For organized intellectual life, higher education in particular, has a totemic system in every respect interconnected with the totemic system of capitalist productive relations as a whole. We have already stated that notions of ritual and opinion are always associated "totemically" with persons to whom is attributed a particular category of authority as a speaker for opinion, a Priest of, in this case, academic ritual. In this way we are led to examine the immediate basis for stultification not merely in particular procedures and rituals of education, but in the authority-structure of educational institutions.

It is easy to make the connection between this authority-structure and its rituals and the factory system. These standardized phenomena, the emphasis on drill in standardized procedures of production, the student's ironic allusions to the "diploma-mill," or "factory," the influence of corporate hiring criteria on academic programs, etc., are superficial evidence, of course. Nonetheless, this superficial connection is proven to describe a real connection
underneath the mere appearance. It is easy to show how academic
life is controlled by the direct influence of governmental and cap-
talist subsidies, or to show the connection between the standards,
forms and contents of formal education and the power of the capital-
ist employer who collectively, by his opinion of a university, his
preference or dislike for its graduates as a whole, may encourage
its growth or abort its influence. However, it is merely empir-
icism — albeit an empiricism of better intentions — to attempt to
account for the form of the educational process on the grounds of
these factors and influences.

The real basis for the disease under con-
sideration is the authority-structure of organized intellectual life.
As Durkheim reports, that "it is from opinion that it"(science)"holds
the force necessary to act upon opinion." That educators should be
subject, therefore, to that general body of opinion which compels
parents to similarly oppress their children, "brainwash" and stultify
them, is more necessary than remarkable. It is also necessary that
the university should acquire an authority-structure with the same
genereal "totemic forms" and social purposes as the authority struc-
ure of the bourgeois family. The principal social function of educat-
ors, like the principal educational function of the bourgeois family,
is that of "head-fixers."
Again, we have noted that one of the principal features of social life in general is that preeminence which each institution gives to its opinion of itself. In the Catholic Church, the central feature of institutional life is necessarily the "mass." It is merely empiricism to attempt to account for the preeminence of the principle of the "mass" on syncretic grounds or other merely subjective influences. It is the gathering together of the members of an institution in a meeting overlaid with sensual color which is the principal means by which the institution establishes — brings into social currency — and reinforces the rituals and opinions essential to bind its members to the tasks of maintaining the institution's integrity. It is only by such meetings that any social institution establishes its authority, its forms, and obtains the consent of its members for the authority of its accredited spokesmen. It is out of the actual meeting or the organizational forms which are the abstract expression of the integument binding the members together that the spokesmen acquires a mystical, charismatic — if you like, importance in the eyes of his laity. It is by such meetings that the leader becomes a leader actually, and by which leaders move the masses of an institution to concerted action. In this way we know that he who would move society to action on behalf of some cause and who, at the same time holds the meeting, the organization of the people in poor regard — we know that that person is deluded or a fraud.
In education, the means by which organized intellectual life maintains its opinion of itself, imposes rituals and opinions on its subjects, is the classroom, in which the instructor assumes the role of a priest, establishing a system of "marks" — rewards and punishments — through which he uses the force of classroom opinion generally to provoke a higher or lower social opinion of each individual member. It is well-known that the social opinion of an individual is the basis, in principle, for his own self-esteem, effecting a growth or diminution of his "ego-strength." This "ego-strength" itself generally determines the individual's capacity for action. In sum, if one degrades or ostracizes an individual socially, one is a fool or worse to subsequently criticize the ostracized individual for the quality of his performance. As to the effects of this authority-structure, the individual student has only to make a critical self-analysis of his own attitudes toward instructors, faculty supervisors, etc. It is not merely a matter of the practical influence which these authorities may or may not possess in respect to the student's opportunities in later life, it is not a matter of the actual attainments of instructors in their fields, etc., but is an affective outlook born of organized intellectual life as a social institution, as a microcosm of authority-organized society, and the "imprinting" of a disposition to respond to the academic authority structure with the "reflexes" of bourgeois family life in earlier childhood.
The instructor asserts that mastery of the ritual is the means to knowledge. This is a lie, or, more charitably, a profound self-delusion on the part of the instructor. The emphasis on ritual has nothing to do with the actual achievement of knowledge; the real object of ritual is the maintenance of the authority-structure of organized intellectual life. It is the means of inculcating ideology, it is a feature of instruction which is best exemplified at any Roman Catholic mass.

It is small wonder that bourgeois society considers a creative thinker as a "genius," the product of a miracle! That is, provided his creative activity can be circumscribed within the bounds of accredited bourgeois ideology; any other discoveries: "If they are not in harmony with the mass of collective representations, they will be denied; minds will be closed to them; consequently it will be as if they did not exist." This is, for example, why so many professors foolishly delude themselves that Marxism is unscientific or that they have disproven Marx!

Here we confront the evidence, again, of the interrelationship between ideology and illusion. "Education says it aims to promote knowledge and creative thought. Its real aim — underlying a wishful lie about education's aims — is to stultify thought, suppress creative activity. Precisely because creative act-
Activity is generally a profound threat to the established authority structure of organized intellectual life; just as the bourgeois family is entrusted with the task of "brain-washing," mind-crippling the young, because there, too, creative thought is the enemy of bourgeois thought and institutions.

Psychoanalysis, in exploring the nature of the human mind, is compelled to differentiate among the various tendencies in the human personality. Therefore, sufficiently developed and extended, psychoanalytic work must inevitably tend to expose the superficial, ritual, illusory character of the obedience-training side of education in particular and bourgeois family and social life generally, even to the point of discovering and ennobling in popular opinion the processes of actual creative thought. Freud and his collaborators have already accomplished much of this disclosure in respect to bourgeois family life. Kubie's article and his essay, The Neurotic Distortion of the Creative Process, illustrate the way in which this same psychoanalysis proceeds from exposing the lies of bourgeois morality in the family to exposing the lies underlying higher education's opinion of itself. Thus, we can see the statistician's attack on psychoanalysis in its true light, as an ill-disguised "witch hunt" against "subversives" in the interests of bourgeois ideology.
Profits Versus Sanity

That is not to imply that scientism wishes to stamp out psychoanalysis entirely. The object of the attacks is like the effort to suppress the creative process, an effort to shackle, to bring under control, to impose upon it the ritual and methodology of bourgeois intellectual life. In fact, that object has been substantially accomplished in the case of the Jungian and behaviorist-oriented psychoanalysts. The proponent of scientism feels partly secure in respect to some aspects of psychoanalytic therapy; there are, however, other aspects of psychoanalytic science which threaten to expose "dark secrets" which the bourgeois "priest" is at the greatest pains to conceal even from himself. He will, like a typical patient in the early stages of analysis, agree to the treatment as long as the doctor does not try to probe into "certain areas". It is hardly accidental that prohibited subjects are precisely those of the greatest therapeutic significance. Similarly, an experienced management consultant knows that the areas which the client instructs him to keep "his nose out of" are usually the very areas of the greatest importance for solution of the problems of that firm. It was on precisely such grounds that the established faculties of psychology reacted so violently, with such unprincipled, contemptible rage to Freud's
disclosures on those aspects of sexuality, of 'normal' bourgeois family life, which those professors were at such desperate pains to conceal from themselves. To the degree that psychoanalysis will consent to violate its own ethical requirements and not probe the issues involving the patient's, now the scientist's, areas of resistance, psychoanalysis will be tolerated.

It is readily demonstrated that bourgeois society has no desire to promote sanity. It only wishes to curb what it terms abnormal behavior, that is to say behavior which deviates from the legal and moral standards of bourgeois prescriptions. The concept of norm socially is more or less adequately indicated by its true synonym, obedience.

It happens that many people who are disturbed are also abnormal in their behavior, just as some of the most seriously diseased personalities are normal. It is clear enough that the notions of normal and abnormal are legal fictions, or, at least moral fictions having little direct correspondence with the individual's state of mental health. This feature, the obedience test, is demonstrated in one of the more prevalent criteria of so-called 'normality,' the individual's form of response to the structured system of rewards and punishments established by capitalist
capital society, or, the extreme legal fiction, of the "knowledge of the distinction between 'right' and 'wrong'." It only happens, as might be readily comprehended, that certain impairments of mental health lead to mental and active behavior in direct conflict with one of these standards. However, if a herd of hysterical zombies satisfied the essential test, the obedience test, of bourgeois morality, the bourgeoisie would be amply satisfied with the state of national health. What concerns the bourgeoisie was aptly epitomized by a waggish slogan coined to promote contributions to mental health campaigns: "Support Mental Health or I'll Kill You."

Capitalist "priests" assume that mental health can be statistically controlled just because the legal notion of mental health assumes that the state of mind can be determined in respect to concepts in more or less direct correspondence with the legal and moral 'norms': categorical moral and legal judgments of bourgeois society. Some particularly demented expressions of this delusion are encountered in attempts to construct a mathematical logic of morality, or of human behavior generally, as in "game theory," etc. The notion that psychology is not properly statistical, by argument or example of practice, implies immediately that the "natural" standards of human behavior do not necessarily correspond to bourgeois
morality, which tends to lead to the "absolutely subversive" inference that capitalism is not the "natural," "most perfect" organization of human society, not precisely the only "best of all possible worlds."

Capitalism, however, despite the viciousness with which the spread of psychoanalytic ideas was originally regarded, has been compelled to admit of the extension of psychoanalytic practice for reasons paralleling its promotion of medicine. Just because capitalist society is confronted with the problems of abnormal behavior associated with certain dysfunctions of the personality, and because even capitalist morality does not ordinarily permit the extermination of its subjects in large numbers, and because the costs of incarceration are a drain on surplus value, capitalist society had to tolerate psychoanalysis on practical grounds. The job of the psychoanalyst, and the condition of bourgeois toleration of its practice, is that he confine his work to delivering abnormal people back to the production-line in condition to produce profits, not to disrupt by abnormal behavior the orderly social processes of capitalist society, such as by running amuk.

Capitalism, as is shown by the exponents of its more liberal tendencies, is more or less tolerant of a certain kind and amount of "liberal" criticism of its errors and abuses.
is willing to allow statements which attribute personality disorders to slum conditions, to bad parents, to divorce, to "excessive" oppressions, etc. In this way, capitalism consents to have psychology explain personality disorders — rather, abnormal behavior — on the grounds of such abuses, excesses and errors. Capitalism will even, weighing the social cost of the "abuses" and "errors" against the financial cost of corrections — such as decent housing and wages for the most oppressed — occasionally manage to correct such errors, make token corrections or profess to look favorably on future steps to correct. It is even willing to have the bourgeois family criticized as an institution, to tolerate public discussion of correlations between "abnormal" parental behavior and disturbances in the personalities of his children, even to permit some changes in value respecting the secondary norms of family and social life generally. Finally, however, it demands that the psychologist, sociologist, confine himself to such topics in the etiology of mental disease, and to keep scrupulously clear of all analysis which establishes a necessary connection between mental disease and the bourgeois norms, the more essential features of bourgeois morality and social relations. Finally, the assigned task of the psychologist is limited, by the capitalist authorities, to readjusting the 'abnormal' or potentially abnormal person to normal bourgeois life, to reconciling the disturbed individual, the victim of oppression, to a state of reverence and obedience toward his oppressor. It demands that
psychoanalysis sell out its essential ethics and its scientific principles in the interests of "adjustment psychology" and the reconciliation of the oppressed to his oppressor. This contemptible revisionism, properly classed with the Social-Democratic revisionists of Marx, is exemplified in Carl G. Jung's Yale Terry lecture, Psychology & Religion, and in practice by the behaviorist tendencies among psychologists generally.

However, it is not enough that revisionists sell out, subject psychoanalysis to the neurotic rituals of statistical ideology; the high priests of capitalist intellectual life demand that an accounting statement be drawn up, to be delivered to their master, showing that for certain aggregate fees (which the bourgeoisie may permit obedient psychologists to collect) that the capitalist production line has received a certain amount of additional profit by way of a quantity of formerly abnormal (i.e. disobedient) individuals returned to their appointed labor. The test which the accountant will apply for that purpose will not, be found in any of the worthless textbooks which purport to define a norm for mental health; the accountant's standard is celebrated in the even scarcely articulate "Jeffreysisms" of any foul-mouthed semi-literate political hack presiding over a local magistrate's court.

That is the meaning behind editor Ubell's challenge to psychoanalysis: it is only a demand that "head shrinkers" degrade themselves, prostitute themselves to the role of "head fixers."